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Summary
This research report presents the findings of case study research with youth in six
locations in Zimbabwe, carried out within the Power, Violence, Citizenship and
Agency (PVCA) programme. It shows how young people experience growing up as
citizens in a country known for its repressive regime, and highlights the differences
for young men and young women. Young people consider political violence as one
of many forms of violence and other challenges they face in life.  Election periods
bring increased risk, when youth feel targeted. After the turbulence of elections has
waned, surveillance by state security agents persists, affecting how young people
use the public sphere. Between elections, forms of structural violence pose more
challenges to youth than physical, political violence: patronage along party or
ethnic lines is a major barrier to finding jobs, and generational differences deny
young people a voice. High unemployment levels can result in youth participating
in violence orchestrated by political actors. This research shows also that family
and peers have a strong influence on how young people choose to engage in the
public sphere and respond to the polarised political environment. Youth
empowerment strategies thus need to go beyond economic empowerment. This
report argues that a shift in vision is required so that government, aid agencies and
civil society recognise the importance of active citizenship among youth and make
it a priority area for interventions. Programmes should build the citizen capabilities
of young people and improve relations between them, their parents and
communities, and public authority. 
Keywords: violence; political violence; youth; gender; citizenship; agency;
governance; Zimbabwe. 
Marjoke Oosterom (PhD) is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of
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of fragility and chronic violence. The project aims to understand how citizens deal
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Introduction
This research report presents the findings of case study research in Zimbabwe,
carried out within the Power, Violence, Citizenship and Agency (PVCA)
programme. It discusses how young Zimbabwean citizens experience their
citizenship and respond to forms of political violence in their country. The
generation that was born after 1980 has grown up in an increasingly repressive
regime environment. The regime, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF), is known for its intimidation tactics and violent suppression of
political opposition, particularly during the election periods. Academic studies on
Zimbabwean youth have discussed the manipulation and co-option of youth by
political parties, which sometimes use them to carry out violent acts, against a
background of rising youth unemployment (Dzimiri 2014). This corresponds with a
sub-section of the literature on youth in developing countries, which describes the
‘youth bulge’ as a reservoir of trouble makers and militants (Urdal 2004). There
are, however, large groups of ordinary youth who do not engage in political
violence, but who try to develop and increase their opportunities in everyday life,
navigating the political landscape. It is this ordinary youth that this study is
interested in.
The central question the PVCA programme seeks to answer is: which forms of
agency do men and women exercise in response to insecurity and violence? The
research in Zimbabwe focuses on youth from 16 to 25 years old. Like the other
PVCA case studies (see Oosterom 2014;  Scott-Villiers et al. 2014; Tadros 2014),
the study takes a ‘seeing like a citizen’ approach (Gaventa 2010) to analysing
violence: a bottom-up view of violence and politics, how they are entangled, and
how citizens exercise agency in response to violence in their everyday lives. This
approach acknowledges that different social identities – such as gender and age –
shape citizens’ perceptions and agency. Using this lens, the study explores how
young citizens experience political violence and how they respond, specifically
looking at how gender differences inform their agency. Studies on violence in
Zimbabwe have highlighted the ‘peaks’ in political violence around the national
elections (Badza 2008; Laakso 2002; LeBas 2006). This study focuses on
everyday experiences of violence to address the relationship between political
violence and other, more structural forms of violence outside election periods.
The report describes the range of types of violence as experienced by youth at the
local level, in six urban, peri-urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe; in the
Mashonaland and Matabeleland regions. It shows how young people experience
growing up as citizens in a country known for its repressive regime, and highlights
the differences for young men and women. Election periods are periods of
increased risk, when youth feel targeted. After the turbulence of elections has
waned, surveillance by state security agents persists, which affects how young
people use the public sphere. Young people consider political violence as one
among the many forms of violence and other challenges they face in life. For
young women, domestic violence, and assaults of verbal and physical abuse within
their communities, are what they experience more frequently. For young men, local
crime, lack of jobs and the difficulty of starting a family are major challenges. In
between elections, forms of structural violence pose more challenges to youth than
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physical, political violence: patronage along party or ethnic lines is a major barrier
to finding jobs, and generational differences deny young people a voice. 
The predominant explanation for youth involvement in violence is the high level of
youth unemployment (World Bank 2011). This is also suggested for the
Zimbabwean context (Hamauswa and Manyeruke 2012). Others have presented a
more nuanced perspective, pointing out the various reasons why political parties
have successfully mobilised youth to utilise violence around elections, and for
campaign activities more broadly (Dzimiri 2014). This research, however, shows
that many young people try to stay away from party politics as much as possible
and if they do join in, it is often in order to protect themselves and their families.
Some have developed initiatives that help them stay out of politics and that help to
improve their lives at the same time. Furthermore, the research shows that
unemployment is indeed important, but family and peers have a strong influence
on how young people choose to engage in the public sphere and respond to the
polarised political environment. Another factor that can influence the decision
whether or not to engage in politics is that political parties offer recognition, status
and a possibility for gaining experience aside from any  material incentives. 
This can have important implications for policy. Since unemployment is seen as a
primary driver of youth involvement in violence, the creation of employment for youth
is a key strategy to resolve this (World Bank 2011). Such an approach neglects other
forms of exclusion experienced by young people and other social and political
relationships that motivate violence. A focus on economic inclusion and economic
empowerment is insufficient to make young people better citizens, and fails to
recognise that they want to be acknowledged as social and political agents. This
report will argue that other, more comprehensive and far-reaching policy responses
are required, as current approaches do not respond to the magnitude of the
problems that youth face, and nor do they unlock the potential of youth. First, and
above all, a shift in vision is required that sees active citizenship among youth as a
priority area that needs diverse, comprehensive programmes and strategies. For
thinking about specific programmes, young people want and need opportunities to
meet and interact socially outside the deeply politicised arena. This can establish a
social foundation for learning and practising how to discuss, and take action on,
issues of public concern. Second, strategies need to build ‘citizen capabilities’ among
youth such as civic leadership, give them experience in collective action, and enable
them to gain experience in negotiating with public authorities. Third, to overcome a
sense of social exclusion that undermines citizen agency, social relations between
young people, their families and communities need to be improved. 
This report is structured as follows. Section 1 outlines the central concepts of this
study: active citizenship, violence, and youth. Section 2 describes the research
process, the six research sites and the research methodology. Section 3 presents
the findings. It starts with an overview of the types of violence that youth
experience, ranging from physical violence to structural violence. The findings also
reveal their perspectives on the situation of youth in Zimbabwe. Subsequent
sections describe the everyday life and social backgrounds of the young people,
and how this informs their agency. The final sections show the various ways in
which young people deal with political violence and intimidation. The conclusion
summarises the most important findings and ends with recommendations for
actors that are interested in youth empowerment programmes.
11
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1 Youth and citizen agency in
contexts of violence
Zimbabwe is a repressive regime environment, which has seen high levels of
political violence around the time of elections and continual attempts to suppress
freedom of the media, actors in the political opposition and civil society, and the
citizenry in general, ever since the ZANU-PF government came to power in 1980.
As for each of the studies carried out within the Power, Violence, Citizenship and
Agency (PVCA) programme, the point of departure for this case study in
Zimbabwe is to understand how citizens have agency in contexts of violence. This
study adds to an emergent body of literature on citizen engagement in repressive
regime environments. The case study of Zimbabwe specifically asks how the
country’s youth experience and respond to their political environment and the
violence that occurs. The theoretical framework of power, violence, citizenship and
agency was therefore broadened to include a focus on youth and violence. 
This report focuses on the lived experience of youth in the context of Zimbabwe
and adopts the perspective of ‘seeing like a young citizen’. The report, as well as
the research process, aims to let youth speak for themselves when reflecting on
their situation and violence. This is an important difference from many existing
studies on youth and violence, some of which are discussed in this section. Many
of these studies have almost objectified young people in an attempt to explain
youth involvement in violence. Sommers (2011) has therefore called for in-depth
ethnographic research that brings the voices of non-elite youth into the debate
about violence, and for structural causes of violence to be included in the analysis,
instead of solely a focus on young people as perpetrators. The ways in which
young people express agency in response to violence need to be analysed against
the wider social-political context that informs the situation of youth in society, taking
into account the sub-identities and diversity of youth. Their backgrounds and living
conditions shape their agency in response to the issues they face, including violence. 
The first section below outlines the conceptual framing of active citizenship and
agency as used in this study. It then discusses some current thinking about agency
in settings affected by violent conflict and repression. The subsequent sections
discuss the concepts of youth and highlight the main points from the existing
literature on the relationship between youth and violence. 
1.1 Citizen agency in repressive regime environments
The research project is firmly grounded in an active citizenship approach, which
views the concept as ‘a social process through which individuals and social groups
engage in claiming, expanding or losing rights’ (Isin and Turner 2002). This takes
citizenship beyond a notion of rights of individual citizens that they were ‘given’ by
the state. Instead, a citizen is a person with rights, who should be able to
participate actively and equally in public life, in the processes where rights are
defined, and in decision-making processes that affect their lives. The approach
extends the meaning of citizenship as a relationship between the citizen and the
state, to include relationships among citizens, and between citizens and
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communities. Citizens often define citizenship, their rights and duties not only in
relation to the state but also in relation to their social environment and collective
life (Kabeer 2005). A perspective on citizenship that encompasses relationships
between citizens also implies that citizens have obligations towards their
communities and vice versa. Often the object of citizenship struggles is to change
society itself. Citizens may aim to gain recognition and demand rights and equality
from the state, but citizens also make similar demands on fellow citizens. 
Taking an actor-oriented approach to citizenship brings to the fore the values people
are struggling for, the rights they claim, and the collective action they take to attain
those rights. This approach to citizenship focuses on agency, the conditions that
limit or support agency, and the capacities to act as citizens (Nyamu-Musembi
2005). The concept of agency is thus integral to a notion of active citizenship and
refers to the potential to reflect, imagine and act, and it may be manifested in
concrete actions (Frie 2008). People’s capacity to act as agents depends on their
histories and social and cultural backgrounds. It is through social interactions that
the individual becomes aware of his/her rights, learns about forms of citizen
engagement, and gains a political consciousness (Kabeer 2005; Lister 2003). 
Important for the sense of citizenship is the question of what a citizen identity
entails. There is a direct relationship between one’s understanding of his or her own
citizen identity and agency. ‘A citizen’s identity is an awareness of his relationship to
his state and to his fellow citizens’ (Heater 1990:185). It is argued that the way
people see themselves as citizens has consequences for how they understand their
rights and obligations, and for whether they are willing to act upon these, and in
what form (Isin and Wood 1999). Hence the emphasis on the entangled relationship
between identity and citizenship: a citizenship identity is constructed, continues to
evolve, and is one of many identities held by actors (Isin and Wood 1999; Lister
2003). Existing inequalities and forms of exclusion in society affect the capacities of
certain citizens to fulfil their citizenship. Differentiated mechanisms and institutions
in society limit the possibilities available to particular groups or identities for
participating in society and politics. Nyamjoh (2006) argues that there are
‘hierarchies in citizenship’, which implies there are differences in how certain groups
of people or identities sense the quality of their citizenship, which may affect their
behaviour as citizens. The category ‘youth’ as a social identity is a complicated one,
as Section 1.2.1 shows. For the African context, scholarly work has indicated that
many young citizens are placed lower in the hierarchy of citizenship in terms of
having voice and influence (Honwana 2011).
An emerging body of literature discusses how citizenship evolves in conflict-affected
societies (Pearce 2007; Pearce, McGee and Wheeler 2011; Oosterom 2014). It has
been studied less in authoritarian regime settings, which is the context in which this
study is located. Conflict studies have advanced in differentiating the various types
of agency expressed by populations living in conflict areas. Much of this literature
discusses people’s agency in relation to security and survival. More recently,
though, the more political forms of agency, disaplayed when people negotiate with
public authority or powerful actors, have been highlighted.
Vigh (2006) uses the term ‘social navigation’ to describe how people try to shape
their life trajectories in dynamic conflict environments. People are inventive, and
relations and power continue to be configured in these settings. They assess their
13
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environment and adjust themselves and their actions in response to it. Moser and
Horn (2011) distinguish ‘coping’ from ‘resolving’ agency to highlight the difference
between short-term actions for survival and agency aimed at addressing the
causes of violence. Barter (2012) describes levels of agency, some of which can
be considered ‘more political’ to the extent that citizens engage with or challenge
the more powerful authorities (often armed actors) in their environment. Civilian
populations may passively resist the presence of armed actors or they may openly
confront them. They may also choose to collaborate with them to negotiate their
security and access to resources and livelihoods. 
These studies refer to situations where active conflict is taking place: dynamic
contexts where violence may occur at any time and then wither away. The PVCA
case study in South Sudan is an example of such a setting (Oosterom 2014).
Here, citizens are constantly alert and have developed strategies to mitigate
violence if it ever comes their way. Authoritarian regime settings are different from
this. In some repressive regime environments the situation can be stable for a very
long time. Political repression is constant, but not necessarily manifested in
everyday physical violence. Regimes usually target dissenting voices in the
political opposition and civil society using a range of tactics, from formal legislation
that restricts freedom of association and speech to hidden tactics of intimidation,
detainment and violence (Bhasin and Ghandi 2013). This variety of repressive
strategies have been well documented for, for instance, Rwanda (Beswick 2010).
To resist political repression on politically sensitive issues,  such as national
reconciliation, Rwandan citizens use ‘weapon of the weak’ tactics (Scott 1985) and
‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1990): they do not openly confront the regime, but
through their discourses, gestures and civil disobedience they express their
dissent (Thomson 2011). Despite the differences between dynamic conflict settings
and relatively stable repressive regime environments, this study assumes that
Zimbabwean citizens exercise agency in similar ways to citizens in conflict-ridden
contexts: through social navigation of the structures of violence, risks and
opportunities, always alert to their heavily politicised environment.
1.2 Youth 
1.2.1 Youth as social identity
This study sees youth as an identity that is socially constructed and recognises
that relations of power and control affects social notions of youth (Ukeje and
Iwilade 2012). Existing literature has shown that the category ‘youth’ is a contested
concept, which can refer to age as much as to a social and political identity. Many
African countries use a wide age band to define who is a youth. The African Union
Youth Charter defines youth as those aged 15 to 35, whereas UNICEF uses the
age band 15 to 24 (Gupte, te Lintelo and Barnett 2014). In social sciences it is
recognised that defining youth by age group is problematic. Youth is seen as a
socially constructed category, because society has certain expectations of what
adult roles and responsibilities entail (Abbink and Van Kessel 2005; De Boeck and
Honwana 2005; Honwana 2011; Ukeje and Iwilade 2012). Marriage, starting a
family, having your own home and a livelihood to support dependants are among
the most commonly used milestones that mark the transition into adulthood. The
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label ‘youth’ is used as a basis for the hierarchical organisation of families and
communities (Chikwanha and Masunungure 2007). For his study on Zimbabwe
Wilkins (2013) views youth as a political category: youth who themselves use the
label ‘youth’ in the political sphere. Ukeje and Iwilade (2012) argue that the concept
is never neutral but part of the struggle of youth to gain influence in society, vis-à-
vis older generations that dominate the social and political institutions. 
Seeing youth as a social construct means that it is historically situated and can
therefore change (De Boeck and Honwana 2005). It also draws attention to the
fact that the meaning and lived experience of being a youth varies significantly
across social contexts, depending on how societies frame youth and configure
their social roles (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012). Gupte et al. (2014) argue that a generic
notion of ‘youth’ is valuable for generating baseline data and assessing progress;
however, it risks overlooking the social differentiation within this broad category
based on their social and economic backgrounds, whether they are rural or urban
youth, male or female, or belong to younger or older youth cohorts. All these
variables will matter for how they experience, for instance, their political environment.
It is argued that, in modern times, youth make the transition into adulthood at a
much later age because of the increasing difficulties they face in achieving all the
social and economic milestones that society and culture require them to meet
(Honwana 2011; Sommers 2011). Many African young people are in a situation of
‘waithood’: waiting for adulthood (Singerman 2007). It is a state of ‘prolonged delay’
to entry into adulthood (Sommers 2011), or a state of limbo (Honwana 2011). The
causes of ‘waithood’ have to do with the wider economic, political and cultural
contexts in many countries of the global South. Youth between 15 and 24 years
constitute 40 per cent of the workforce in African countries (World Bank 2012). They
are disproportionately affected by unemployment, and when they do find work this is
often in unfavourable working conditions (Gupte et al. 2014). Unemployment has
social implications as it sustains a situation of ‘waithood’. According to Sommers
(2011) the cultural context and governance of a country strongly shape the
prospects for youth. Depending on the prevailing cultural norms, young people face
highly rigid norms about what adulthood entails and risk facing public humiliation as
‘failed adults’ (Sommers 2011). Governments have influence on how easy or difficult
it is to achieve certain milestones that mark adulthood, for instance through policies
on land ownership, housing and employment (Sommers and Uvin 2011). 
Political marginalisation is a common concern among African youth (De Boeck and
Honwana 2005): exclusion from formal political processes and local institutions
where decision-making takes place, a denial of their voices, and a lack of respect
from older generations. Often, young people are seen as ‘people in the process of
becoming rather than being’ (Honwana 2005) and they are therefore not regarded
as full and equal citizens. An Afrobarometer survey compared the political attitudes
and behaviour of youth with those of older generations in 18 countries (Chikwanha
and Masunungure 2007). It found high levels of support for democracy across age
groups. However, young people are less satisfied with their countries’ democracy
and more pessimistic about the future of their regimes, and have less confidence
and trust in important public institutions. Levels of participation in voting and other
forms of political participation (e.g., attending meetings, raising issues) are lower
among youth, youth are less partisan than adults and, although they are expected
to protest more, the data do not show a generation gap with regard to participation
15
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in street protests. A more recent survey in 19 of Africa’s most democratic countries
confirms lower levels of political participation (Resnick and Caale 2011): young
people are less likely to vote, they question the legitimacy of electoral processes,
and they manifest a lower level of partisanship. Also this study challenges the
predominant idea that youth are more likely to protest. Dissatisfaction with the
government’s ability to create jobs is an important reason for youth to support
opposition parties, whereas for non-youth, dissatisfaction with a broader range of
issues is associated with partisanship.
1.2.2 Youth and violence
The relationship between youth and violence has become a popular theme in the
study of African societies and politics. Much of the knowledge has been generated
for countries affected by armed struggle and civil war, or for areas affected by high
levels of violent crime. A repressive regime environment like that of Zimbabwe is
different, but the debates on youth in relation to war violence and violent crime
raise important issues for thinking about youth and political violence. This section
highlights a number of the issues and reiterates the need to bring in youth
perspectives.
In academic and policy circles an accepted proposition about youth in developing
countries is that countries that have a ‘youth bulge’ (where youth form the majority
of the population) risk experiencing instability and violence. This argument is
backed up with statistical evidence that shows that most wars take place in ‘young
nations’ (Leahy et al. 2007; Cincotta 2008). This argument gained credibility when,
especially in the 1990s, youth seemed to be involved as the leaders of insurgencies
and instigators of violence in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Liberia, rather than as
followers (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012). The 2011 World Development Report states
that young males are the main perpetrators of violence and the victims in contexts
of violent conflict, as well as outside civil war contexts in countries with high levels of
violent crime (World Bank 2011). More recently, the uprisings in the Arab world are
thought of as initiated and driven by young populations (Ezbawy 2012; Al-Momani
2011). The predominant idea is thus that large groups of unemployed, disgruntled
youth are a risk to governments and stability. In response, governments may take
measures that pre-empt youth insurgent actions. Nordås and Davenport (2013) find
that governments facing a youth bulge are more repressive than other states. 
The relationship between youth and violence has also been studied outside of war
contexts, for instance in urban contexts and in countries with high levels of violent
crime and youth gangs (Gupte et al. 2014; Kunkeler and Peters 2011; Jones and
Rodgers 2009; WDR 2011). High levels of rural to urban migration, especially among
youth, have led to the rapid expansion of African cities with young populations
(Gupte et al. 2014; UN-Habitat 2014). Cities and slum areas in developing countries
face high levels of violence, usually described as violent crime. For various reasons
this violence is associated with youth. 
The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) considers high levels of
unemployment and idleness as the main causes of youth involvement in violence
(World Bank 2011).The WDR presents survey data showing that also youth
themselves mention unemployment and idleness as the main reasons for
involvement in insurgent groups (39.5 per cent) and in gangs (46 per cent), while a
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sense of security and ideological motives scored far less (World Bank 2011: 80).
The 2011 WDR acknowledges that a lack of a sense of dignity and respect are
also important drivers for involvement in violence, but it sees employment as the
main starting point for acquiring a sense of dignity and status.
The assertion that countries with young populations are at risk of violence has
invited criticism. Sommers (2011) warns against overreliance on correlational data,
which may be valid correlations but cannot provide full explanations and they may
obscure everyday realities of youth. He and other scholars also caution against the
discourses that describe youth as an undifferentiated mass of security threats
(Sommers 2011: 297). Sommers argues that many countries with young
populations do not experience violent conflict and countries where wars have
ended (Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Rwanda) still have a
youth bulge. Furthermore, discourses linking youth to violence portray young men
as inherently violent, ignoring the social and political structures that cause
violence, including forms of marginalisation and exclusion of youth (Richards 1997,
2002; Utas 2005), and ideal-type masculinities as constructed identities. 
A number of studies show the complex relationship between youth, their social and
political contexts, and forms of violence from a youth perspective. Rodgers (2009)
shows that an important reason for joining gangs is the will to protect oneself and
one’s family when faced with increasing state violence and waning security. Youth
have also been mobilised by political actors to form militias (Kunkeler and Peters
2011; Anderson 2002). In the case of Kenya, for example, various reasons for the
existence of vigilante groups/gangs have been documented. Kenya has a long history
of youth being mobilised as militant ‘youth wingers’ by minsters and politicians, which
in the past were more clearly associated with pro-establishment leaders (Anderson
2002). Newer vigilante groups emerged from marginal communities and have a more
complex relationship with politics. In Nairobi, rising crime figures, caused by
urbanisation, and the failure of the police to address this increase in crime, led to a
mushrooming of vigilante groups. Other authors emphasise that youth gangs have
offered their members a sense of belonging, and access to services and employment,
something the state was unable to do (Frederiksen 2010). 
1.2.3 Agency in response to violence
An explanation for how youth express agency in relation to violence needs to be
grounded in a more general understanding of the situation of youth. When young
people live in violent environments, violence may not be their primary concern. They
have to cope just as much with ‘waithood’ and everyday bread and butter issues.
Young people undertake a range of activities to ‘get by’ and deal with life’s challenges.
As described above, these ordinary life challenges have a lot to do with the exclusion
of youth from economic opportunities and formal politics. These conditions influence
how youth respond to violence. It is important to restate that there is no single youth
identity. Although young people may share the same experiences of exclusion,
differences such as gender, social class and whether their background is urban or
rural affect their agency, including agency in response to violence.
Young people develop a range of tactics in response to a lack of economic
opportunities. Some choose to migrate in search of jobs or they become successful
entrepreneurs in the informal economy (Honwana 2011). Some choose to engage in
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intimate relationships with ‘sugar daddies’ and ‘sugar mamas’ in exchange for
material benefits. In response to a sense of exclusion from the formal political arena,
due to distrust of political institutions and political leaders, young people have found
alternative spaces and niches in society where they express agency and craft their
identities. New media technologies offer them ways to appropriate the public sphere,
and also they may find popular culture more relevant than formal politics as a
channel for expressing political views among themselves (Ukeje and Iwilade 2012).
Honwana (2005, 2011) refers to De Certau’s (1984) distinction between tactics and
strategies in everyday life. She argues that agency among youth is often ‘tactic
agency’: focused on responding to immediate needs rather than ‘strategic agency’
aimed at achieving long-term goals. Some argue that the agency ‘to get by’ is also
part of a political project to liberate the youth and fight paternalistic structures
(Ukeje and Iwilade 2012). The question, again, is when agency expressed by
youth can be considered a more political form of agency, or citizen agency.
In response to violence, then, Ukeje and Iwilade (2012) describe Murphy’s (2003)
four models that attempt to offer explanations for youth participation in violence,
each with a different view on agency expressed by youth.  The first is the ‘coerced
youth model’ in which youth are forcefully conscripted in insurgent groups. The
second is the ‘revolutionary youth model’ in which youth rebel against political and
economic marginalisation. Participation in violence is thus deliberate. The third is
the ‘delinquent youth model’ which refutes any ideological motivation of youth to
engage in violence and depicts it as opportunistic and criminal. The fourth is the
‘youth clientelism model’ which emphasises how youth manage their dependency
and agency by navigating patronage relationships.
Several authors have argued that many young people choose not to engage in
violence when faced with life challenges such as unemployment and insecurity.
They show they have the skills, agency and creativity to make the most of their
situation and improve their lives (Sommers 2011; Honwana 2011) and simply ‘try
harder’ (Utas 2005). Engagement in violence is carefully considered. Utas (2005)
shows the complexity of women’s roles, strategies and options that informed their
responses to the Liberian civil war. Many young women decided to take part in the
insurgency to avoid being harmed by violence, to run away from domestic violence
at home, or to increase their life opportunities. 
Section 1.2 described the concepts of citizenship, agency, youth identity, and
violence. Since a citizen identity matters for citizen agency, it is important to unpack
how young people see themselves as citizens and experience citizenship. The
section emphasised that youth citizenship is about the relations between young
citizens and the state and between youth and other citizens. Studies that bring in
youth perspectives on violence show that identity, social relationships and political
context, all matter for their responses to violence. Furthermore, studies show that
there is too bit an emphasis on youth involvement in violence and that there is much
to learn from how youth experience and respond to violence on an everyday basis.
Taking these insights forward, this study shows how young Zimbabweans
experience their citizenship. Section 1.3 describes the political context in which
young people grow up as Zimbabwean citizens.
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1.3 Political context of Zimbabwean youth
The history of the liberation struggle that led to the independence of Zimbabwe in
1980 and the subsequent development of the ZANU-PF government into an
increasingly repressive regime have been documented in detail (Bratton 2014).
This section highlights some of the most important developments and
characteristics of this political environment, presenting the background against
which agency among young Zimbabwean citizens must be understood. It will also
describe how the position of youth in Zimbabwean society has been discussed in
existing literature.
The political environment in Zimbabwe, but also the country’s society in general,
are often described as deeply polarised. There is a long history to this polarisation.
During the long and bloody liberation struggle, from 1965, but more seriously from
1972, various insurgent groups had fought the colonial regime, but had at times
also confronted one another. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU),
dominated by Shona groups. The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)
was the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which was
predominantly Ndebele. The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) came out as the winner of elections in 1980. Tensions with ZAPU
remained, leading to resistance against the ZANU-PF government in the southern
region of Matabeleland. The ZANU-PF government responded with a violent
campaign in Matabeleland from 1982 to 1987, known as Gukurahundi (Shona for
‘the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rain). The
government deployed the army’s Fifth Brigade, which carried out widespread
atrocities in the region. An estimated 20,000 people, mainly Ndebele, lost their
lives. The violence ended after the Unity Accord in 1987, after which ZAPU was
integrated into ZANU-PF. 
In 1999 a new opposition party was formed under the leadership of Morgan
Tsvangirai: the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), with roots in the labour
movement. MDC posed the first real threat to ZANU-PF’s hold on power
(Masunungure 2004). In 2000 it effectively mobilised for a ‘NO’ vote in the
referendum on the new constitution. MDC had the backing of the labour
movement, which had a significant membership. It was able to speak to and
mobilise grievances in the population. ZANU-PF, fearing the potential votes of
commercial farmworkers, who were largely being excluded from the discussions
about land reform, instituted violent commercial farm seizures when the proposed
constitution was rejected. Commercial farmers, some of whom overtly supported
the MDC, became a specific target since these farmers could potentially influence
more than 300,000 farmworkers to support MDC. MDC presented itself as a
‘young’ movement and had linkages to the student movements. MDC was also
strongly supported in Matabeleland, owing to Gukurahundi and the political and
economic marginalisation of the region. MDC won 47 per cent of the votes in the
2000 parliamentary elections and it had even won support in rural areas in
Mashonaland, which are associated with ZANU-PF. It also removed ZANU PF’s
ability to alter the constitution, since it no longer possessed a two-thirds majority.
ZANU-PF stepped up its repression of the political opposition and civil society
actors, which it associated with MDC. State violence and intimidation, in particular
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in the election periods, furthered the polarisation in society and deepened divisions
along party lines. The elections in 2002, and to a lesser extent those in 2005, were
accompanied by political violence. MDC split in 2005, when factions could not
agree on whether to participate in the 2005 elections for the Senate, helping
ZANU-PF back to a two-thirds majority. Morgan Tsvangirai continued with the
Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Welshman Ncube
and Arthur Mutambara led the breakaway faction. 
There was more political space for the opposition around the March 2008
elections, which were won by MDC-T; Mutambara’s faction also won seats. After
Tsvangirai won a majority in the presidential election in May (47.9 per cent while
Mugabe won 43.2 per cent), requiring a presidential run-off in June, ZANU-PF
mobilised the security apparatus, war veterans and youth militias to launch an
extremely violent campaign against MDC supporters and civilians. ZANU-PF ‘base
camps’ were established in many locations, used as torture camps where physical
and sexual violence was perpetrated. An estimated 200 MDC activists were killed
and thousands of people were tortured (Freedom House 2012). Tsvangirai
withdrew from the presidential run-off and Mugabe won, unopposed.
The international community now responded, as violence continued after the
elections. With involvement of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), and particularly of South African President Thabo Mbeki, a Global Political
Agreement (GPA) was brokered in September 2008 and a Government of National
Unity (GNU) was formed. It was to be an uneasy coalition government under
President Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. State reform was part of
the GPA and, much delayed, a new constitution was adopted in 2013. ZANU-PF
used these years to undermine the GNU, to consolidate its party structures and
strengthen its networks, to sow division within the political opposition and make it
look weak and incapable of governing (Kriger 2012). It took time to prepare for the
2013 elections, whereas MDC-T seemed to neglect the necessary groundwork for
preparing and expanding its constituencies (Moore 2013). ZANU-PF won the 2013
elections with a strongly disputed landslide victory, forming a vast majority in
parliament. 
A system of intimidation and repression is characteristic of an authoritarian regime
like Zimbabwe. To a certain extent ZANU-PF inherited the systems used to control
a population and suppress dissenting voices from the colonial regime. It used
these to consolidate its powers and continued to develop state institutions and
state-sponsored entities for this purpose. The civil service expanded from 62,000
personnel in 1980 to 181,402 in 1989, which allowed ZANU-PF to influence entry
to and promotion within the civil service (McGregor 2002). The state security
agents, notably the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Zimbabwe
Republic Police, form a sophisticated system of surveillance repression from the
highest political level to the very local level. When large numbers of ZANLA war
veterans started to demand compensation for their role in the independence
struggle in the late 1990s, this was a possible threat to ZANU-PF’s power. Bowing
to the demands of the war veterans, Mugabe granted them a huge unbudgeted
award, and this immediately led to the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar. Together
with the costs of  military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
the economy begun to slide, and inflation triggered food riots in 1998. This was
now palpable dissent and rejection of ZANU-PF.
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However, Mugabe’s decision to placate the war veterans created a cadre of non-
state activists loyal to the regime, which could be used to intimidate and control the
population. Many of these self-defined ‘war veterans’ were clearly too young to
have participated in the Liberation War, but it was they who took the front role in
land invasions and election mobilising (Sachikonye 2011). 
In this context, ZANU-PF sees youth as a potential opposition force as well as a
category of people that can be mobilised for its own interests. The role of youth in
state violence has expanded since 2000 (Dzmiri 2014), but needs to be seen
against the background of a long history of conquest and struggles in which the
link between power and capital accumulation has been forged by violence (Moore
2013). The youth militias formed in 2000 were at the forefront of the land invasions
and again mobilised for election violence. Youth groups such as Chipangano in
Mbare, Upfumi Kuvadiki in Epworth and AlShabab in Kwekwe seek to mobilise
support for ZANU-PF, and threaten MDC supporters. Knowing that grievances
simmering among youth in the 1990s had helped to trigger the food riots and
demonstrations from 1996 to 1999, the government created the Ministry of Youth
and Development and Employment Creation in 2000, as well as the National Youth
Service (NYS). The NYS is a programme that was meant to teach vocational skills
and instil a sense of patriotism to raise young people as ‘good Zimbabweans’. The
programme was transformed into a large-scale paramilitary training programme
(Dzmiri 2014). The government uses it to give any kind of civil service job to NYS
graduates, excluding those who did not enrol. NYS graduates (also named ‘Border
Gezi youth’, or ‘green bombers’, named after the founder, the politician Border
Gezi) have been used to force people to attend ZANU-PF meetings and rallies
during campaigns, and they have also perpetrated violence. 
In general the violence has been much more pronounced in the rural areas of
Zimbabwe and, in the rural areas, considerably worse in some provinces than
others. For example, the three Mashonaland Provinces have recorded the highest
number of violent incidents, while the number has been much lower in the two
Matabeleland Provinces (CSVR 2009). This is not exclusively the case though, and
Harare and its environs have seen very high levels of violence, and youth militias
and ZANU-PF youth have been increasingly active in the urban areas.
Young people have also expressed resistance to the regime. Hodgkinson (2013)
notes that the role of student movements in organising nationwide demonstrations
had acted as a catalyst in spurring other civil society groups into action in the
1990s. Young people have used popular culture like the ‘Urban Grooves’ music
genre to express their views on society, using lyrics that reflect the language of the
oppressed to protest against their exclusion from mainstream politics (Mate 2012). 
For opposition political parties, and youth supporting these, being actively political
in rural areas has been highly risky and, to a certain extent, the youth have borne
the brunt of the violence. But it has also been the case that youth from the
opposition have also become increasingly violent, with both inter- and intra-party
violence being reported. In fact, one of the publicly expressed reasons for the split
in MDC in 2005 was the failure of Tsvangirai to address violence by party youths.
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2 Research process
2.1 Research process
The research was carried out in two regions: Mashonaland and Matabeleland. In
both regions three research sites were selected. In Matabeleland case studies
included Magwegwe (urban suburb of Bulawayo), Rangemore (peri-urban area)
and Thsolotsho (rural area). In Mashonaland case studies included Kuwadzana
(urban suburb of Harare), Goromonzo (peri-urban area) and Murewah (rural area).
In all sites the research team met three times with groups of young people over a
period of 15 months. The political situation was too sensitive to go out to the
research sites for Phase 1 and part of Phase 2, because of the election period and
the aftermath. Instead, participants came to town to work with the team. Field visits
were made for Phase 2 Matabeleland and for Phase 3 in both regions, with the
exception of Thsolotsho, this being always a politically sensitive area.
The research team consisted of the IDS researcher, two researchers from RAU, and
two facilitators from two community-based organisations (CBOs): Tree of Life (TOL,
Harare) and Grace to Heal (GTH, Bulawayo). Both organisations have been long-
term partners of RAU. TOL works on trauma healing for individuals and communities
who are victims of political violence. GTH implements a range of reconciliation and
healing activities for the same target group, and organises Peace Clubs for youth. 
In each research location the team worked with 20 young people divided in groups
of 5 and worked with each group for a full day in each phase, with girls and boys in
separate focus groups. The sample included an equal number of boys and girls.
The participants were identified by community facilitators affiliated with TOL and
GTH. Several of our participants had participated in GTH or TOL activities, but the
majority had not. The CBO facilitators had invited some of the youth they knew to
participate and asked them to bring friends. This created a bias towards youth that
had been exposed to CBO activities, as well as a bias towards youth who had
experienced political violence – since that is the target group of the CBOs.
Findings need to be understood in this light. This sampling strategy enabled a level
of trust in the process, because both CBOs are trusted by young people and their
parents for staying outside of party politics. Moreover, many of the young people
already knew each other. This was very important in the context of Zimbabwe,
where people are reluctant to speak about certain issues in public because of an
awareness of state surveillance that happens at the very local level. 
The profile of the participants gives an overall picture of their educational and
employment status: all of them had completed primary education and 45 per cent
had completed secondary education (this percentage was lower in rural Murewah
and Tsholotsho), although only few pupils achieve 5 ‘O’ level passes. Only 4 per
cent had completed post-secondary education. In terms of employment, 95 per
cent were unemployed, 65 per cent were self-employed in the informal sector, and
5 per cent had a formal job.
The team initially envisaged meeting the same young people on each occasion, in
order to build a rapport. This was not feasible, however, because some could not
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attend each session because tjeu were engaged in seasonal labour or casual
work, or (particularly in Matabeleland) they had temporarily migrated to South
Africa to look for work. The majority of the young people participated in all three
phases, but a number of them were replaced by others in Phase 2 and/or 3.
2.2 Research locations
This section provides the contextual background of each of the six locations, using
existing sources where possible, complemented with what participants told the
team about their home area.
2.2.1 Research sites in Matabeleland 
Tsholotsho 
Thsolotsho is a rural area in Matebeland, bordering South Africa (see map). It is
one of the areas that was heavily affected by Gukurahundi between 1983 and
1987. The population of Matebeland generally supports MDC, and so does the
Tsholotho population. As in other parts of Matabeleland, economic marginalisation
and high levels of unemployment havd motivated many people, including the
youth, to try their luck in South Africa. However, life in South Africa is not
necessarily better and many end up in the informal economy or engage in criminal
activities. 
Rangemore
Rangemore is a peri-urban, low-density area located 25km from Bulawayo city
centre along the Bulawayo Plumtree road. Rangemore used to be a coloured
community belonging to the socioeconomic middle class, who worked in Bulawayo
city. After 1980 black Zimbabweans bought plots from the coloured population
(Dube and Chirisa 2013) and the coloured population resettled in the Bulawayo
suburbs. The new residents used the reasonably large plots for gardening and
fresh farm produce to sell in Bulawayo markets. As it is an MDC support area near
Bulawayo and a low-density area, ZANU-PF has less interest in maintaining
control over it. Participants reported that party activities happened only around
election time. Because of the stories they had heard about other places they were
afraid of political intimidation, but had less direct experience of it. In between
elections they mainly experienced party politics through the distribution of farming
inputs along party lines. 
The youth also suspected that the ongoing process of land subdivision was
politicised. Many of the current landholders in Upper Rangemore are under
pressure to sell their land, because of the government’s plan to find space for the
growing urban population in the Bulawayo-Umguza peri-urban area (Dube and
Chirisa 2013). Upper Rangemore comes under the Umguza Rural District Council.
Our youth participants interpreted the land subdivision process as a struggle over
territorial boundaries between Bulawayo City Council and the bordering Umguza
Rural District Council, both claiming Rangemore. Dube and Chirisa (2013) explain
that the Umguza district council is worried about losing revenue when selling land
in Rangemore. But in the view of the youth, the ZANU-PF wanted to curb the
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influence of the MDC by parcelling out land in Rangemore and selling it to people
who affiliated to ZANU-PF. At the time of research, land subdivision was ongoing.
Many original residents had sold parts of their land to ‘investors’. The issue had
created animosity among residents, as some resisted the selling of land. Those
who sold claimed they needed the money and stated they did not have the
resources, irrigation and tools for profitable farming. Others insisted that all land
belongs to the original inhabitants. Our participants were concerned about their
parents selling the land, because this reduced their future livelihood opportunities,
but felt they had little influence over the process. As a result of the ongoing land
subdivisions many new people had migrated into Rangemore. Youth commented
there was no ‘unity’ in the area. They furthermore felt that Rangemore was
neglected by the government. The local councillor does not live in the area and
people have little access to government officials. There is no secondary school and
therefore pupils have to commute. The young people described the place as
lacking entertainment and for the boys alcohol consumption at the local bar is their
main activity.
Map of Zimbabwe showing research sites




































Source: Redrawn from Ezilon Maps.
Bulawayo, Rangemore
1 This incident was reported by Amnesty International on 4 June 2008 at www.amnesty.org/en/news-
and-updates/news/sharp-crackdown-political-opponents-zimbabwe-20080604 as well as on
Zimbabwean news sites; see The Zimbabwean, 25 May 2008 at www.thezimbabwean.co/news/12952/
mdc-leader-shepherd-jani-murdered-mutilated-body-dumped-in-goromonzi.html 
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Magwegwe
Magwegwe is a high-density suburb in Bulawayo and an MDC support area.
Magwegwe has a community centre where various courses are run and some
young people organise activities. It also has a public library. Support for MDC is so
high in Bulawayo, that ZANU-PF is not as aggressive as in, for instance, certain
urban areas in Mashonaland. 
2.2.2 Research sites in Mashonaland
Murewah 
Murewah is a rural area near Zimbabwe’s eastern border. It was a heavily
contested area during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and it was also affected by
the civil war in Mozambique, when Renamo rebels came hiding in the area,
particularly Murewah North, and harassed the population for supplies. It has
always been a ZANU-PF support area. In the 2002 elections there was a lot of
violence in the area. Operation Murambatsvina in May 2005 (International Crisis
Group 2005) led to groups of displaced people from the towns arriving in Murewah,
many of them MDC supporters. The operation itself may also have persuaded
Murewah residents to start supporting MDC (Bratton and Masunungure 2006).
Increased support for MDC fuelled tensions in Murewah and violence was
widespread during the 2008 elections. Senatorial candidate Shepherd Jani was a
prominent MDC-T member known for protecting MDC supporters in the area.
Shortly before the presidential run-off in the 2008 elections he was abducted by
suspected CIO agents. His mutilated body was found a few days later in
Goromonzi.1 According to key informants this weakened the MDC structures in
Murewah. In 2013 there was less violence, but the young people reported forms of
intimidation, described below. 
Goromonzi
Goromonzi is a peri-urban, low-density district 40km south-east of Harare in
Mashonaland East. It is a politically important district, and several prominent
politicians and ministers went to Goromonzi High School. The prison at the
Goromonzi police station is believed to have an underground prison area,
constructed by the colonial regime, which has been used by ZANU-PF to detain
and torture prominent opposition members in the past. In the early 2000s fast-track
land reforms were implemented in Goromonzi (Marongwe 2011; Murisa 2011).
Marongwe (2011) shows that the institutions responsible for the implementation
were captured by ZANU-PF members and members of the state security
apparatus. As a result, large farms were allocated to war veterans, prominent party
members and local elites (Marongwe 2011). At present, land subdivisions are
continuing, as part of the plan to urbanise Goromonzi as the city of Harare is
expanding. Participants stated that land subdivision was a major concern among
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residents, who feared they would not be adequately compensated for their land, or
that they would be evicted. Young people claimed the process was politicised as
plots of land were sold to, or taken by, prominent members of ZANU-PF. A
residents’ association, Simukai, was trying to monitor whether the process of land
subdivision followed due process and it pursued certain cases in court where they
felt residents were disadvantaged. The association had started a ‘youth chapter’ to
encourage young people to start income-generating activities. 
The (Jesuit) Catholic church has a strong influence in the governance and politics of
the district. Jesuit missionaries owned all the title deeds of the land in Chishawasha,
an area within Goromonzi. The church therefore still controls the land where
residents live and farm, and presides over many community affairs. There are many
missionary schools and clinics in the area, so the Jesuits are a source of
employment for many people. The participants claimed that even traditional leaders
follow the instructions of the Jesuits. The head of the Jesuits in Goromonzi is Father
Fidelis Mukonori, a senior figure in the Jesuit Order and Chaplain to President
Mugabe. The participants claimed that Father Mukonori has a close relationship
with the regime and would not tolerate support for the opposition. 
Kuwadzana 
Kuwadzana is a high-density suburb of Harare. MDC has held the parliamentary
seat since 2000, but there is also support for ZANU-PF in the area. The first MDC
member of parliament was Learnmore Jongwe, a student leader at the University
of Zimbabwe. He died in prison in October 2004 in suspicious circumstances,
charged with the murder of his wife. The next MDC MP was Nelson Chemisa, also
a young and inspirational figure for many young people; he was Minister of
Information and Communications Technology in the Government of National Unity
and is now serving his second term as MP. Kuwadzana has a large population
descending from immigrants from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, and from
other parts of Zimbabwe. The young people stated this had never led to any social
problems. They said there is generally a sense of unity in Kuwadzana, but there
are divisions between ZANU-PF and MDC supporters.
2.3 Research methodology
Phase 1 (May/August 2013) focused on the forms of agency among youth in
response to the types of violence and intimidation they experienced in everyday
life. In Matabeleland this phase was carried out shortly before the July 2013
elections and in Mashonaland shortly after. Phase 2 (November 2013/January
2014) looked at the life histories of individual young people and at what currently
informs their citizen engagement. Phase 2 also examined the conditions in which
youth feels empowered or disempowered and which spaces they consider ‘safe’.
Phase 3 (May 2014/August 2014) looked at how the youth live their everyday life
and explored their perceptions on a variety of issues: youth as a social identity in
society, ethnicity, job and education opportunities for youth, and expectations of the
new government. The following sub-sections describe the sets of methods used in
each phase. 
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Phase 1: forms of agency and types of violence
The team carried out a range of participatory methods in all focus groups, which
were adapted from: Moser and McIlwaine’s (2004) participatory appraisal
methodology for researching violence in urban contexts; Moser and Brown’s
(2012) study methodology for the study of violence chains; and methods for
analysing power relations documented in the Carnegie Handbook of Power
Analysis (Hunjan and Pettit 2011). The exercises included listing and scoring types
of violence; causal flow diagrams; actor and institutional mappings; and visual
exercises exploring agency in relation to the self, peers and the community when
violence occurs. During the exercises the team used topic guides to ask questions
about the nature and frequency of violence experienced and by whom it was
perpetrated. They then asked questions about the impact that the violence had on
the youth, noting differences for girls and boys. Concerning agency, questions
were asked about responses to the violence itself and the young people’s
behaviour towards the perpetrators. 
Phase 2: growing up as young citizens
Anchor point for this theme were the River of Life drawings: a visual exercises
whereby young people individually draw their lives as a flowing river, with elements
in and around the river representing important events, people, and traits. The
question to prompt the drawing was ‘Can you depict your life as a river, showing us
everything that was important for how you became the person you are now’. After
the drawing was completed a second prompt asked ‘Which of these elements have
influenced you in who you are as a citizen of Zimbabwe – and you are free to add
to your drawing if you wish’. These drawings were followed up with individual semi-
structured interviews in a private setting, whereby the team could pursue certain
themes from the drawing and link the drawing to present ideas and behaviour
about agency in the political context. In another drawing exercise, participants
created three drawings that were then discussed in focus groups. They had three
prompts: (1) can you draw a situation in which you felt empowered; (2) can you
draw a situation in which you felt disempowered; (3) can you draw a safe space.
‘Safe space’ was explained as a place where youth can get together and interact
freely and talk about anything. 
Phase 3: everyday life and perceptions
In this phase the team carried out more conventional focus group discussions,
using a topic guide with questions about how the youth spend their time,
livelihoods of their families, and their views on a range of issues that concern
youth. In one drawing exercise the young people made a cartoon drawing about
one ordinary day in their lives, from morning to evening. In a second drawing
exercise they depicted a fictional story about young people addressing any kind of
problem in the community, which then prompted a discussion about agency. The
next day the team carried out a community walk with the participants, asking them
to show them around the area and all the places where the youth hung out – or
avoided. Detailed notes from the walks complemented the data from the focus
group on the previous day, giving a full picture about everyday life of young people. 
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2.4 Caveats
The purpose of this report is to describe the situation of Zimbabwean youth from
their own perspective. This is important, because youth are targeted by certain
political actors. This study therefore did not include methodologies to compare
youth perspectives and behaviours with those of adults. Some of our findings will
not apply to youth alone. For instance, adults face similar forms of economic and
political exclusion as those described by the youth. More research is needed to
explain how mechanisms of exclusion are different for youth and adults, and how
patterns of engagement in politics and political violence vary across generations.
Because of the way in which the participants were identified, this report cannot
claim to have included all sub-identities within the social category of youth. First, it
is likely that really marginalised youth were not part of the sample – for example,
those engaged in crime, drinking on the streets, and from the poorest families. The
relationship between these types of young people, politics and violence needs
further research. Second, it is noteworthy that very few of our participants admitted
they had voluntarily participated in election violence out of material interest, which
is interesting, since unemployment is considered a driver for youth involvement in
political violence. This may reflect a bias in our sample: the selection process of
participants failed to include youth who engage purely for material gain. It may be
caused by the methodology: only one individual interview per participant may be
insufficient for such sensitive issues to come up. Further research is needed to
investigate the social backgrounds and motivations of those young people who
become ‘party youth’ during elections and join in the violence.
2.5 Research ethics and risks
In a context like Zimbabwe, it is important that participants feel free to speak their
mind without any anxiety over possible repercussions from their involvement in the
process. At the start of each session, the research team explained that all
information was treated confidentially. A ‘social contract’ was agreed among
participants about respecting each other’s opinions and not sharing information
with anyone outside the group. In none of our sessions were any outsiders or
individuals representing public authorities present. We selected venues for our
sessions that allowed a confidential set-up. Names of our participants were stored
separately from the transcripts. The report has avoided linking events to
individuals, and the real names of participants are never used. 
3 Youth perspectives on youth
identity and violence 
A lively conversation is taking place in the corner of a community centre in one of
Bulawayo’s suburbs. A group of five young men in their early twenties sit in a
circle, chatting. Laughter erupts when they list the nicknames the parents and
elders in their neighbourhood use for them – all derogatory terms that describe the
young men as stubborn and idle. ‘Olova’, for instance, meaning ‘all over’, refers to
the youth who are hanging about all over the place, having nothing to do but to
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make trouble. They joke, but then get serious. True, many of them have no jobs
and are ‘all over’ on the streets. They also acknowledge that some young people
get into trouble. However, labelling youth as the actual cause of the trouble masks
the structural reasons for the challenges they face.
This section describes the background of the youth who were our participants and
how they view themselves as citizens of Zimbabwe. The section starts with a
description of their living conditions and lifestyles. As the research process
revealed that forms of structural violence were considered serious problems in
everyday life, the subsequent section explains how youth experience structural
violence in the economic, political and social domain.
3.1 Who are ‘the youth’ and what are their lives like? 
The majority of our participants lived with parents or one parent, or relatives. A few
lived on their own. Especially in Matabeleland, both parents could be in South
Africa, and in these cases the young people stayed either on their own, taking care
of siblings, or with relatives. Many of the participants had lost a parent at a young
age. As a consequence, they lived with uncles and aunts, or with the remaining
parent who in many cases had found a new partner. Boys highlighted the fact that
families breaking up particularly affects their education and welfare. Not living with
parents creates uncertainty about whether relatives are willing to pay for education.
Girls emphasised the difficult relationships with the relatives they were living with.
There were many stories of participants who did not get along with their step-
parents and had therefore left home, and of girls who were sexually harassed by
step-fathers or relatives. Clearly, not living with parents was experienced as a risk
to their wellbeing. 
Many Ndebele participants had dropped out of school before completing their ‘A’
levels. Many reported that parents were unable to pay their school fees or exam
fees. Often a divorce or the illness or death of a parent had meant there was not
enough money for them to go to school, and young people living with relatives
were not always supported to pursue their education. Several of the participants
dropped out of school in about 2008, when the election turbulence had economic
implications for their families. A number of schools closed and of the students who
would have been sitting their exams that year, not all were able to sit them the
following year, and thus they missed out on obtaining O-level or A-level certificates. 
Households had various sources of income. Sometimes one parent worked, and
many parents worked in the informal economy. The mothers worked as vendors in
town, sold vegetables from home, reared  chickens, did tailoring. In rural areas,
parents cultivated a plot of land. Many of the young people had one parent or a
relative in towns in Zimbabwe or in South Africa, who sent money home. A few had
a parent or uncle and aunt in the United Kingdom. We found that parents or
siblings who sent remittances wanted the money to be used mainly for the
education of their family members. Young people with younger siblings at school
would therefore receive little of the extra cash.
The majority of our participants were unemployed. With a lack of jobs and few
education opportunities, how did they spend their time? The findings show that our
young participants were far from ‘idle’: they were trying hard to make the best of
2 Focus group boys, Magwegwe, 21 May 2014.
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life and were sometimes able to make some improvements in their lives. They
revealed some of the structural causes of their marginalisation, and the range of
tactics used to navigate these conditions. Younger participants who were not in
school usually had little to do and depended on parents or relatives to provide for
them, whereas the older ones were active in the informal economy – although
often not permanently – and contributed to their households. Common income-
generating activities among boys are buying and selling mobile phones and cards,
working as mechanics or in construction, selling firewood, and moulding bricks.
Those who had had some training in a craft , such as carpentry, would try to use
their skills to earn money as often as possible. In Tsholotsho (Matabeleland), boys
who played in the better soccer teams (the number one leisure activity for boys)
made some money when they played in tournaments. Some tried to start up their
own businesses, such as a food stall: 
[P1] Due to unemployment, me and my friend we started a small shop a
month and a half ago. We sell chips and Russian sausages. We started the
shop because we want to avoid committing crime and if you are unemployed,
many things that happen in your community, there is violence. They point
fingers at us, that you guys are guilty because you spend your time doing
nothing. So I want to show the people that we try to do something. I was once
arrested for something I didn’t do. It was said that I stole someone’s phone. I
was in prison for three weeks. I noticed that if you employ yourself, there are
no jobs here. We decided to employ ourselves. A brother of ours who is in
South Africa brought us the machines and gave us some start-up capital. The
shop is not legal [all five boys laugh]. 
[P2 comments] Most things the youth do are illegal. 
[P1] But it is legal to us in the community! Because it is acknowledged by the
community. The police come and buy our things! It’s legal. I work with my
brother and a friend. We have paid back our loan, so we are now making
profit. My brother has gone to SA yesterday to buy a bigger machine for frying. 
[P3] My mum trades currency. Money changing is illegal. But it’s ok because
of the current situation Zimbabwe, since there are no jobs and people are
struggling. It’s wrong but there is nobody who does something right. If they
arrest my mum, she simply pays the police a bribe and they let her go. They
tolerate it. And the police also want to benefit from it at the end of the day. It is
helping one another. The people who come to exchange help others. The
police benefits from it, because they get two or three dollars, and everyone is
happy.2
Also in Mashonaland, the youth felt that the economic situation justified their
activities in the informal economy. Many of them knew exactly how to navigate the
corruption in the police force to maintain their activities. The fact that the
government is unable to improve the economic situation for youth, whereas it also
may use force to stop the informal economy activities they need to make a living,
had further alienated the youth from the state.
3 Focus group boys, Thsolotsho, 19 May 2014.
4 Focus group boys, Thsolotsho, 18 May 2014.
5 An income-generating project. Potatoes are not cultivated on land, which requires access to land, but
are instead grown in plastic bags. The participants sell the potatoes at the local market.
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There were also the criminal activities. The boys referred to illegal trade in marijuana
and other substances, in which the police are silent partners and receive bribes. 
This [lack of opportunities] has led the youths going to South Africa where they
start a life of crime in order to survive, and they come and sell the stuff this
side. The young boys from Tsholotsho never complete their education because
they would be thinking of going to South Africa. For them to survive there they
hijack and rob people, therefore it becomes hard for them to come back. The
only time they come back to Zimbabwe is when they would have committed a
very big crime in South Africa. We have such friends who come here and they
tell us their stories of the lives they live in South Africa and we can tell that
they are people of a violent nature.3
The girls spend much of their time around the house doing chores: fetching water,
cleaning, cooking and taking care of children, siblings and grandparents. The girls
described their days as busy, getting up and starting the list of chores. They would
go out to shops or a centre to see friends, perhaps try for jobs. They said they
stayed at home in the evenings, because after dark it is often not safe to be out.
Girls and boys mentioned that some girls engaged in prostitution, but also in
‘girlfriending’ or in relationships with ‘sugar daddies’ as tactics to have access to
cash. During the community walks in Magwegwe (Matabeleland), participants
singled out young teenage girls who were hanging around the beer hall, allegedly
soliciting. One of them was clearly pregnant. In Thsolotsho, boys and girls talked
about how girls may choose to have a relationship early and with a young man
from a specific group: 
Parents even allow their children to go to South Africa when they finish their
Grade 7! Young girls fall pregnant at an early age. […] Parents are now so
relaxed. When a girl reaches Grade 7 they stop going to school and prefer to
get married to guys who come from South Africa. The parents have grown to
accept that as the way of life.4
There were not many opportunities for leisure. Where facilities existed (like
community centres, youth centres and public libraries), young people did use
them, but this depended on the kind of activities run, the nature of the facility’s
management, the perceived safety and neutrality of the facility, and the area where
it was located. The community centre in Magwegwe, for instance, was used by a
youth dance group and a few sports groups. The youth ward officer had initiated a
bag-potato project5 for the youth at the compound, which was actively used. But
the centre had had a bad reputation in the past, when young people had organised
parties that ended up in fights with youths from a neighbouring community. For that
reason, many parents forbade their daughters to go there. The public library in
Magwegwe is located opposite the police station. Though the young people
considered the library to be a useful facility, the girls avoided the place in order not
6 President Mugabe pardoned 2,000 prisoners, mostly women and juveniles, in February 2014 to
decongest the overcrowded prisons in the country. Source: ‘Zimbabwe’s Mugabe pardons 2,000
Prisoners’, CapitalFM, 17 February 2014.
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to be harassed by police. The vibrant youth centre in neighbouring Lobengola
hosted a number of thriving youth groups, including an arts group that had
attracted external funding. The manager enjoyed a great deal of respect among
the youth and had helped many groups to be set up. In Rangemore, where no
public centre exists, the only ‘hang-outs’ are the beer hall, shops and bar where
you can play pool. The boys hang out at these places, but the girls stay away from
them – apart from the girls who are looking for boyfriends. 
3.2 Types of violence in our research sites 
This section presents the types of violence that our participants highlighted for their
home areas, emphasising the differences for boys and girls where relevant. The
six research sites included in the study are not representative in terms of all
possible variations in the kind of violence experienced, or of their intensity, and the
actors who perpetrate them. 
Ranking exercises for the types of violence experienced showed two patterns
across sites. First of all, experiences of political violence and intimidation emerged
strongly in all the research sites, but were emphasised more by the boys than the
girls. Girls included many other forms of violence in their rankings. In everyday life,
girls experience various kinds of violence against women, ranging from domestic
violence to forced early marriages. A second pattern observed from the rankings
and subsequent discussions was that intimidation and surveillance is permanent,
but that physical violence that is politically motivated only peaks around the time of
elections. Therefore, in between elections other forms of violence are considered
more serious in everyday life, such as crime, alcohol and drug abuse, fights in the
community, domestic violence, and forms of structural violence. The ranking of
types of violence per location are presented in Table 3.1 (boys) and Table 3.2 (girls).
Violent crime
Violent crime characterises many of the poorer high-density areas in Zimbabwe. It
was not surprising that this type of violence scored high among boys and girls in
Kuwadzana (Harare) and Magwegwe (Bulawayo). Youth from Kuwadzana talked
about drug-related crime, and fights around the beer halls. Participants said many
young people do not finish school and this has led to a few gangs being formed in
the area. Also youth from Magwegwe reported problems associated with drug and
alcohol abuse and talked about the high levels of crime in their neighbourhood.
Young people reported that crime rates had gone up in their area after prisoners
were given a presidential pardon in February 2014.6 In Magwegwe the police
enforce an informal curfew from 7pm, which has negative impacts on shops,
vendors and businesses in general. Young males especially are harshly treated
when caught by the police after 7pm. The boys recalled one incident when a boy
was standing by his gate after 7pm. He ran into his house when the police passed
by, but the police followed him into the house, arrested him and took him to the
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station where he was beaten up. The police have recently stepped up their
aggressive behaviour, after two dead bodies were found in Magwegwe. The
relationship between youth and the police is complicated by the fact that police want
to be addressed in Shona, and the youth feel the police discriminate against them. 
Boys and girls also gave high scores to violent crime in Rangemore. This is a low-
density area., with no police station, only a neighbourhood watch scheme. Located
on the outskirts of the main town, the area can be a hide-out for criminals. In all
sites, girls were afraid of thugs, who sometimes operate in gangs. In Tsolotsho, girls
referred to thugs as ‘the deportees’ (injiva), indicating that most of the thugs were
Zimbabwean youths who had been deported from South Africa and were engaged
in crime. A common idea among young people was that ‘the best-known criminals in
South Africa are from Tsholotsho’. Prevalence of crime directly affects the mobility of
young women, because just walking through an area can increase the risk of
becoming a victim of crime, especially after dark. Because of the long distances
between plots in Rangemore, for instance, girls spend most of their time indoors. 
Violence against women
Female participants from all six sites reported various forms of violence against
women, while male participants did not report as many forms of violence against
women, and often gave it lower scores when they did. Young women often
included violent crime in public places under the rubric ‘violence against women’,
mainly because they were afraid of becoming victims of rape, or of robberies
turning into cases of sexual violence. Many public places like certain streets,
community halls and beer halls, are not considered safe, because that is where
men and boys hang around and drink. In all research sites, girls spend a lot of time
at home apart from the necessary shopping, economic activities, fetching water
and collecting firewood. They socialise with friends at home or near the shops and
are usually home before dark. 
Domestic violence was the form of violence against women experienced most
often, receiving high scores in all sites. Forms of domestic violence ranged from
sexual abuse to forced labour and being denied resources, or even food, by
partners and family members. Girls in various sites attributed the high prevalence
of domestic violence and emotional abuse to unemployment and the fact that
many couples were very young. From the life story interviews it transpired that
domestic violence and abuse often happened to young women who had come to
stay with distant relatives, away from their parents. Our participants stated that
cases were usually not reported to the police, because of the fear that it might lead
to the arrest of the breadwinners of the family or to social relationships with
relatives breaking down. Female participants considered child abuse and forced
labour of younger girls to be a form of domestic violence. They associated it with
families breaking up and parents having to migrate to find work, after which
children often had to take over the labour of the adult who had left. 
Girls pointed to economic factors that caused violence against women. Jobs are
scarce, and girls experience pressure from (potential) employers to have sex in
return for a job. In Matabeleland, sexual favours to a boss was an issue that came
up in all locations. Several participants said that they had been approached by
their managers – even those who were married – who had ‘asked’ for a sexual
35
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 79
relationship. Some explicitly stated they had refused, no one admitted to having
accepted, but all emphasised how difficult it was to keep their jobs if they refused
to have sex. 
Finally, social institutions were responsible for various forms of violence against
young women. This was particularly the case in rural areas, but examples were
cited in all sites, and cultural norms concerning early marriage and domestic labour
were experienced as oppressive. Girls from Goromonzi talked at length about
violence perpetrated by the Baptist church, which defends early marriage and
marriage between young girls and old men. Elders in this church perform virginity
tests on young women and expose those girls who have committed ‘offences’ to
the church community. 
Political violence and intimidation
Participants emphasised physical manifestations of political violence: destruction of
property, houses burnt down, and injuries and death caused by the violence
inflicted by security actors and party youth. All of these have long-lasting
consequences for entire families. Despite the fact that such violence is not
experienced on an everyday basis, boys and girls agreed it was so serious that
they gave it high scores. Generally, experiences of political violence, repression
and intimidation were more common in the sites in Mashonaland (Kuwadzana,
Goromonzi and Murewah) because these areas are more contested in terms of
ZANU-PF aiming to maintain its control and curb MDC support. In Matabeleland,
where the majority of the population supports MDC, ZANU-PF seems to use less
political violence but it is thought to undermine the region economically. 
Youth labelled forms of exclusion as political violence if there was any sense that
political parties and politics were the cause of exclusion from access to economic
resources and opportunities. They considered threats from party-affiliated actors to
take away economic resources as a form of political intimidation. For instance,
exclusion of (suspected) opposition supporters from access to farming inputs and
food aid was the most important form of political violence highlighted in Murewah.
Traditional leaders, with the help of National Youth Service (NYS) youth and war
veterans, identified ‘errant families’ who would not receive the distributed farm
inputs. Such practices continue throughout the years in between elections. Section
3.3 further explains forms of structural violence that were highlighted by the young
participants: mainly exclusion from jobs, land ownership and resources, based on
ethnicity and party affiliation. 
Participants grouped forms of intimidation under the rubric of political violence, but
the discussions showed that intimidation and repression are experienced as a
permanent threat, which intensifies around elections, while physical manifestations
of political violence are usually limited to election periods only. Intimidation is
carried out by state actors and party-affiliated entities like party youth. 
It is manifested in direct threats as well in the experience of being under
permanent surveillance, due to the presence of intelligence officers in the
community. Interestingly, participants from the sites in Mashonaland were able to
identify specific people in their communities known to be members of the CIO
while many of the youth from Matabeleland did not know who exactly the local
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informants were but they ‘had learnt’ that they existed and this knowledge affects
their behaviour, as Section 3.4 will explain. In urban Magwegwe, despite low levels
of political violence in the past, the youth were still wary about informants, dressed
in civilian clothes, who gather intelligence. ‘We have been told and we know that
there are state agents in our area and they are there just to listen to all we say. The
knowledge of their presence intimidates us. We are not free and we cannot say our
opinions out loud’, explained a girl in Magwegwe. The boys said they could
recognise the external agents, who would attend big gatherings or parties in
Magwegwe and could be identified by their vehicles and the way they moved
through the crowd. 
Across the three sites in Matabeleland, but especially in Tsholotsho, the ‘sphere of
Gukurahundi’ prevailed. The ways in which knowledge about Gukurahundi was
transmitted to younger generations fed into feelings of political repression. Only a
few of our participants knew the details of what had happened during Gukurahundi
from what their parents and grandparents had told them. The majority of the
participants only knew that ‘bad things’ ‘involving Shona people’ had happened in
‘the 1980s’ and that there were good reasons to fear uniformed forces.
Election violence 2008
Given the age band of our participants (16–25) it is not surprising that the 2008
elections had left a strong impression and that these events were highlighted in the
discussions. The majority of the older participants had directly experienced or
witnessed election violence. There were slight variations across the research sites
in terms of how election violence was manifested and who had perpetrated it (see
Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The patterns of violence during the 2008 elections are well
documented. This sub-section highlights what our participants specified about their
home areas, because for many this has shaped their attitudes to political and
violence in the present day. 
In Kuwadzana, high levels of violence targeted MDC supporters in 2008. Youth
from both sides had engaged in violence. In the case of the 2013 elections,
participants said that threats, forced participation in political meetings and physical
assaults were the most important forms of violence. In between elections, youth
supporting different parties sometimes clash; a game of pool at the bar can end up
in a fight. Many young MDC-T supporters are not afraid to show their party
affiliation, but also say they experience the polarised environment as a threat. Peri-
urban Goromonzi was for a long time a ZANU-PF support area and therefore
experienced little violence in the early 2000s. When MDC gained votes in 2008 the
regime responded violently. Torture camps were established (Institute for War and
Peace Reporting 2012). The participants stated that there had been little physical
violence in 2013, although there had been high levels of intimidation and forced
participation by ZANU-PF youth. Road blocks made moving in and out of
Goromonzi difficult, and the young people said that even the combi drivers were
stopped and made to chant ZANU-PF party slogans and songs. Finally, in rural
Murewah forced participation at militia bases had been the most important form of
violence, where people experienced various forms of brutal violence. Boys had
been beaten when they had attempted to flee or fight back. In 2013, Murewah
youth had only experienced intimidation and forced participation in rallies
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organised by the ZANU-PF youth. The ZANU-PF youth in our focus groups had not
experienced this as violence, saying they had to support their fathers ‘against the
enemy since the country was at war’. During the 2013 elections NYS youth were
stationed near the polling station and wrote the names of the people who came to
vote. They asked voters to raise their voter slips and show the serial number. This
gave voters the impression that the NYS would be able to find out how they had
voted. The participants also reported that people from other areas arrived on buses
to vote in Murewah, increasing the number of voters. In the area of Murewah
where many Mozambican immigrants live, the village heads took them to a polling
station in a different constituency and made them queue separately, exposing them
as foreigners. 
In Matabeleland, urban Magwegwe and peri-urban Rangemore were less affected
by the election violence in 2008 than the sites in Mashonaland. Youth from
Magwegwe recalled that soldiers had abducted parents from their neighbourhood,
who had been severely beaten. For 2013, they stated there were no incidents of
forced participation and that rallies for both parties had taken place without any
violent clashes. Youth from Rangemore indicated ZANU-PF is less interested in
the area because it is a low-density area and was therefore less affected in 2008.
In 2013 campaign activities took place without any violence. In rural Tsolotsho the
2008 election violence had been far more serious. The young people said that
base camps had been established by war veterans and ZANU-PF militia. Several
of our participants had been abducted to these camps, where they were forced to
sing the party songs and many had experienced physical and sexual violence. 
As explained in Section 1.3, Zimbabwe has an extensive system of surveillance
and repression. Election violence is carried out by the state’s security forces and
state-supported entities such as the war veterans, National Youth Service
graduates, and party youth. In between elections these actors are often involved in
politicised systems of exclusion, for example the allocation of market stalls and
agricultural inputs to ZANU-PF members. Exactly how this is manifested depends
on the history of a location, the strength of ZANU-PF or of the opposition, and on
the configuration of social and political actors. It varies between urban to rural
areas, and from one region to another. All these factors need to be taken into
account when looking at experiences of violence in a particular area and at how
youth responds. Section 5 will describe the various forms of agency among youth.
The findings show that they adjust their responses to the types of threat and the
prevalent perpetrators in their areas.
3.3 Forms of structural violence
Section 3.2 showed that, when asked to list and explain the types of violence they
experience, our participants emphasised forms of structural violence. Not all forms
of structural violence were deemed politically motivated in the sense of having
been perpetrated by state actors. This section describes the various forms of
structural violence and shows it is also caused by generational and ethnic
differences. 
7 This is a loan scheme that can be used by people aged 18–35 years to start up a business in which
they create employment for other young people.
8 Focus group, boys, Thsolotsho, 18 May 2014.
9 Focus group, girls, Thsholotsho, 16 May 2014.
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3.3.1 Economic exclusion
Youth feel excluded from economic opportunities and jobs and increasingly sense
that education is not going to make a difference. They highlight corruption,
patronage along party lines, and discrimination based on age and/or ethnicity as
the main reasons why young people are unemployed, reinforcing the effects of the
country’s difficult economic situation. The majority knew about some of the funds
and loan schemes earmarked for youth, like the Kurera/Ukondla Youth Fund,7 but
were disappointed by the way these schemes were implemented. Most participants
were unaware of initiatives and policies such as ZimAsset or indigenisation and
when these were explained, they often commented that they would probably ‘not
benefit the youth anyway’. During the 2013 elections ZANU-PF had promised two
million jobs for youth, but the fact that a year later there had been no improvement
in youth unemployment was yet another cause of disillusionment. 
How to find a job was the primary concern of virtually all participants, and a lively
topic in all focus groups. Discussions showed that simply a lack of jobs is not the
only reason for unemployment among youth. Both boys and girls emphasised that
getting a job depended on being ‘well connected’, on being a member of the right
party, and on giving bribes.
Those who work in the Ministry of Youth choose their close friends and family
members and if you are not known by any member of the Ministry of Youth you
will never be selected or even hear of such programmes. The only time we get
to hear of such programmes is after they have been held. The way they
choose people it’s mainly through friendship, whereas some are chosen
because they are from the same political party.8
In Matabeleland a common complaint was that many managers are Shona, who
will either employ Shona people or demand of Ndebele youth that they speak
Shona:
Shona get first preference because of their school results. The Shona are
treated superior in everything at all times. In Matabeleland, Shonas are treated
better than us. […] We don’t know what happens, but Shona are dominating
everywhere in the country, it is an open secret.9
Shona participants did not mention discrimination in the job market based on
ethnicity, but emphasised party affiliation and ‘being in the right circle’ of people in
powerful positions (from headmen to business people) as the main criteria for
finding a job. Especially youth from Kuwadzana, an MDC constituency, claimed
they were discriminated against wherever they went for jobs. Officials and
employers would simply state they were from an MDC area and therefore were not
being considered. A number of young people from Kuwadzana had joined the
demonstrations organised by MDC to mark the anniversary of the 2013 elections
10 See: ‘MDC-T Youths in Abortive Demo’, The Herald, 1 August 2014, www.herald.co.zw/mdc-t-youths-
in-abortive-demo
11 Focus group, girls, Rangemore, 17 May 2014.
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and protest against the incumbent government, motivated by their disappointment
over the promised two million jobs that had not materialised.10
Many of our participants in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland had tried to apply
for funding or loan schemes. The majority were unsuccessful. Seeing that most of
their friends of the same age had also failed to access these programmes, many
opted to give up trying. In all research sites the young people complained about
the corrupt local government officials, war veterans and party youth who allegedly
appropriated funds and projects earmarked for youth. Many Ndebele young people
felt their applications had failed because they were not Shona or could not provide
evidence that they supported to Zanu-PF. One of the more active young people in
Magwegwe, who knows the ‘rules of the game’, explained he was unsuccessful the
first time he tried, but when his uncle, who is a Zanu-PF district official, wrote him a
letter of recommendation, he received the funding he asked for. 
The participants identified other categories of people associated with ZANU-PF, as
well as those who are actually members of ZANU-PF, who benefit unfairly from
government programmes. In the land reform process farms were given to war
veterans and not to young people, who – with some training and farming inputs –
could have built a livelihood. They felt that young people who participated in the
National Youth Service (NYS) have better access to jobs, loan schemes and
development projects. Several participants commented, however, that even NYS
graduates and those young people who had been heavily involved in campaigns for
ZANU-PF had not benefited as much as they had expected, or were promised.
‘There is no protection for those that campaign for politicians, because soon after
elections these relationships are left to fade. They are not even financially close
[now].’11 Although aligning with ZANU-PF may be a strategy for many young people,
it seems that many others weigh up the risks and opportunities of engagement and
decide to stay out.
3.3.2 Exclusion from political life
Young people are as disappointed and disillusioned about Zimbabwe’s political
institutions as they are about the mechanisms that are supposed to boost their
economic opportunities – if not more so. An important reason for their distrust is
the perceived prevalence of corruption in the state apparatus, from the highest
office at national level down to the local level. They have all lost faith in the
electoral process in particular, saying that voting never makes a difference in their
lives. Several of our participants said they had refused to vote, because of the
violence they had experienced in 2008. All of them said that, again, there has not
been any positive change since the 2013 elections, and many stated that therefore
they would not vote in the future. Participants from both regions expressed the
view that young people are not well represented in any of the political institutions.
This viewpoint is shared even by young supporters and members of ZANU-PF.
They emphasise that the chairman of the ZANU-PF youth league, Absalom
Sikhosana, is in his early sixties and refuses to make way for young leaders. 
12 Focus group, girls, Thsolotsho, 16 May 2014.
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Also at the local level, youth have no confidence that engagement with state
institutions will lead to any tangible outcome for them. Local councillors are
considered part and parcel of the polarised, and potentially risky, political scene. In
Magwegwe, participants joked about the local councillor and called her house a
‘dark place’. The girls stated it was ‘normal’ and ‘expected’ that young people were
ignored by this councillor. Two of the girls had been to meetings she had called,
but said that young people were never given the opportunity to speak at these
meetings and many had therefore stopped attending. However, in Kuwadzana the
young MDC MP and the local councillor were an inspiration to many ‘activist youth’
and the councillor’s home was considered a space where they could meet. 
The role of youth officers, who are part of the Ministry of Youth and responsible for
supporting youth initiatives, is ambiguous. In our research sites many participants
did not know about the existence of youth officers at district or even ward level, nor
about their responsibilities. Depending on their affiliation and behaviour they were
judged to be ‘neutral’ or ‘political’, which affected the young people’s willingness to
interact with them. 
In the rural areas sambukhu (headmen) are powerful actors. They are strongly
associated with ZANU-PF and therefore not considered too dangerous by those of
our participants who strongly supported ZANU-PF (especially those from
Murewah). Generally, however, sambukhu are not regarding as being on the side
of youth, but as part of the establishment that sees young people as trouble-
makers. The participants from Murewah and Thsolotsho was aware that they
needed to treat them with due respect. ‘We side with our community leaders and
we never question or oppose what they say, because what they say is always final.
We do not argue and if a leader says “jump” we just ask how high. They have
power over us so we abide by their rules.’12
Finally, the police are a source of insecurity instead of protection. Our participants
unanimously felt that they harass people more than they help them. Section 3.2 on
types of violence described how the police represent a threat to youth in particular.
This does not mean that young people lack aspirations or ideas about how political
life could be improved for them. Many feel there is a ‘missing link’ between them
and the MPs and therefore MPs cannot represent youth issues well. The majority
felt, however, that young people should have their own MPs and youth quota in
parliament, referring to South Africa as an example. They want to be genuinely
heard by political representatives, to have more frequent interactions and to be
able to voice their demands. 
3.3.3 Social exclusion: perceptions of relations with older generations
The notion of citizenship used in this study includes relations among citizens, in
addition to citizen–state relations. In this regard, youth feel like second-class
citizens because of their marginalisation not just in political life, but also in social
life. Being denied a voice is experienced in the home as much as in the public
sphere. A girl from Thsolotsho said: ‘When we try to talk about what we learn at
13 Focus group, girls, Thsolotsho, 16 May 2014.
14 Ibid.
15 Focus group, girls, Magwegwe, 17 May 2014.
16 Focus group, girls, Thoslotsho, 19 May 2014.
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school they [family members] always tell us to keep quiet, because we do not
know much yet.’13
Across the research sites the youth felt marginalised, and actively disadvantaged
and stigmatised by older generations. The participants in Matabeleland listed a
number of derogatory nicknames older generations use for them: mbanjeni –
marijuana addicts (used even if the young people didn’t smoke marijuana);
izidakwa – drunkards; izifebe – prostitutes; amalema lawo – foolish generation;
otsotsi – thieves; olova – loafers with nothing better to do; amacrook – criminals.
The Shona participants said they were called smokers, addicts, thieves and lazy
people; marombe – loafers; mafikizolo – ‘you only just came’. 
Perhaps the most significant is the term ‘born frees’, which is used in both regions.
The older generations who lived and fought through the independence struggle
use this term for the younger generations born after 1980: those who did not have
to struggle for their freedom. The implication of the use of this nickname is what
makes it significant: the older generation use it to argue that young people are not
entitled to have a say on anything important. Many young people have internalised
this idea of being part of the born-free generation, and it has reinforced the existing
norm that the young have to be deferential in relation to their elders. One of the
participants indicated that ‘born-free’ was used in particular when ‘the grown-ups’
discussed public and community affairs, financial matters, and decisions affecting
the household. Thus, as a consequence, the young are denied voice and
influence. ‘It makes us feel useless, because it is used to imply we cannot face
difficult situations’.14
3.3.4 Ethnic identity and exclusion: perceptions of Shona–Ndebele relations
Ndebele youth, both girls and boys, feel there is inequality between Mashonaland
and Matabeleland: ‘Things happen in Harare that do not happen in Bulawayo.’ In
their view, the Shona youth have much better access to information, resources and
jobs, they enjoy better education and have a greater chance of being selected for
scholarships. A girl commented: ‘It is like the Shona are the legitimate citizens of
Zimbabwe.’15 Many indicated they ‘didn’t really like the Shona’ and called them
‘masvina’ (dirt) when they were angry. They thought Shona people regarded the
Ndebele as backward, less-educated and lazy. 
Generally, Ndebele youth felt the Shona were more respected in urban areas than
in rural areas. In Thsolotsho, rural Matabeleland, Gukurahundi came up as a
reason why Ndebele people have antipathy towards the Shona. Girls from
Thsolotsho said that ‘this hatred is passed on from generation to generation.
Nothing can be done, because those that died cannot be resurrected and those
that were injured cannot be healed. Parents told their daughters not to marry
Shona boys.’16 A heated discussion developed in the focus group with girls from
17 Focus group, boys, Goromonzi, 25 August 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Focus group, boys, Kuwadzana, 27 August 2014.
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Tsholotso, with some arguing that everyone should just stay in their own region
with their own ethnic group and use a passport to travel to other regions. Others
commented that ‘Shona will just always be there’ and it would be an improvement
if Ndebele people were better represented in government.
The Shona participants confirmed that Ndebele people are often considered
stubborn. Goromonzi boys said that ‘Ndebele are good people, but they are looked
down upon’.17 Ndebele are called ‘ndex’, but participants said the Ndebele have
more nicknames for Shona people because the antipathy towards the Shona is
more intense than the other way round. They also acknowledged the inequality
between Mashonaland and Matabeleland, and other regions: 
I doubt whether Bulawayo even gets anything, like ZimAssets, as the Ndebele
people are not highly favoured. In political terms they are said to be opposition
to the ruling party so I doubt whether the youths there are treated equally as
the youths of Harare. […] And in places such as Manicaland the people are
just lied to as they are far from what’s happening. So, you can see when the
word youths is being used [seriously]: it applies to youths in Harare only.18
Some justified the exclusion of Ndebele people from high-level political posts and
stated they could at most occupy the ‘vice’ posts in the military, the various
government bodies, and education institutions, because that was just how
‘Zimbabwean society’ had raised the people: a culture that affirms the superiority of
the Shona people.19 The Shona participants associated this inequality with the
Ndebele support for the opposition, and political leaders in the opposition would
instruct young people to be against the regime. They were aware that the
inequality had historical roots, as the Ndebele were considered to be ‘sell-outs’ of
Zimbabwe and that the Ndebele felt that the Unity Accord had not led to equality
for Matebeleland. But also within Mashonaland youth experienced inequalities.
Young people from Goromonzi said they weren’t even that far away from Harare,
but they are disadvantaged by the government, which works only for ‘the city’.
Thus, Section 3.3 has shown that Zimbabwe’s youth face a range of life
challenges, and living in a repressive regime environment is but one of them.
Some of the problems are not experienced by young people alone, such as forms
of economic and political exclusion based on ethnicity or party membership. It is
not surprising, however, that these problems are felt particularly strongly by the
generation that has only recently left school and is trying to establish itself.
Tensions experienced in relations with older generations and the sense of social
marginalisation are characteristic for the country’s youth. This section has shown
that this has implications for citizenship: exclusion, in whatever form, undermines
citizen agency among young people. Section 3.4 describes social factors that
shape citizen agency among youth.
20 Focus group, boys, Thsolotsho, 3 June 2013.
21 Interview, girl from Magwegwe, 30 January 2014.
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3.4 Young people growing up 
This section describes the factors that influence the attitudes of young men and
women towards politics and the wider political context. The study examined the
process of socialisation of youth in Zimbabwe’s context, using the River of Life
drawing technique in combination with individual follow-up interviews. The findings
show that the attitudes and behaviours of youth towards the public sphere are
strongly influenced by the young people’s social backgrounds, and especially by
family and friends. Their background shapes their responses to the political situation
generally, political party activities, and instances of political violence. Furthermore,
this section shows that also the events of 2008 left a strong impression on the
country’s youth and shapes their ideas about engagement in the public domain. 
A first pattern observed from the River of Life story interviews showed that as well
as influencing young people’s attitude to politics, families and peers both motivate
and temper their engagement in political activities. Many participants stated that
their families had repeatedly warned them not to get involved into politics. One boy
from Tsholotsho said his parents had told him: ‘Either you stay home and don’t do
politics, or you leave the house.’20 A girl from Thsolotsho whose friend and
neighbour tried to persuade her to get involved in a party was told off by the girl’s
father. Another girl explained how her parents had taught her that politics was
something ugly and those people wanting to become involved in politics were
made to do ugly things, which is the reason why she stayed away from it.21
The youth who were very active in either ZANU-PF or MDC-T formed a minority in
our sample. Of this group, most had been motivated to get involved in a party by a
family member (usually a parent or older sibling) or a close friend, generally
someone who was very involved him or herself. For example, a girl from Murewah,
who openly supports ZANU-PF, explained how her family, especially her
grandparents, encouraged her to sympathise with the party in power. Her
grandparents had told her about the liberation struggle and she feels the
instructions of these older people can make a lot of sense. A girl from Magwegwe
had applied to enrol in the NYS because some of her classmates had enrolled and
encouraged her, but she also liked how they were able to provide for their siblings
after they had found jobs as NYS graduates. However, she stated she would never
engage in violent activities during elections.
Girls and boys experience the influence of friends and family differently, which
indicates the gendered experience of citizenship and social relations with family
and peers. Families try to keep girls at home, not least because they are worried
about sexual assaults during political turmoil. In urban areas, however, girls seem
to be more present in the public domain. Boys are generally more inclined to
spend time in public areas, which increases the likelihood that they are exposed to
political party activities. Boys are also likely to be more exposed to peer pressure
from groups of friends they hang out with, either to stay out of political activities or
to engage in them. As it is harder to keep boys at home, families sometimes
decide to send them to safer areas for a period of time.
22 Interview, girl from Kuwadzana, 29 November 2013.
23 The research design for this study did not systematically measure social background indicators, types
and intensity of violence experienced by youth, and present-day levels of citizen engagement. This
would be an interesting area for future study, which would require a mixed-methods approach.
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A second pattern that emerged from the interviews was that youth learn from
family and friends about how to navigate the repressive environment and instances
of political violence. Young people learn from their families and friends from an
early age about the insecurities of the public sphere. They learn that it is not safe
to speak about anything ‘political’ in public. Even in the homes, though most young
people consider this to be their safest place, ‘the walls may listen’. A girl from
Tsholotsho recounted how she had come back from South Africa and made a
remark about President Mugabe at home. Her grandmother immediately warned
her not to say such things. Especially those whose families support the opposition
will have learnt from their parents that they just have to put up with a certain
amount of coercion from political actors, but that they have their vote in the ballot
box. A girl from Kuwadzana told us her uncle had been shot in the leg during the
2002 election violence and that he:
[…] always teaches us children that we should not be seriously involved in
politics and stay away from it. However, sometimes you should not disengage
completely to preserve your life. If they come for you, you go with them if you
like it or not. He says he was shot because he was running away from the
things that happened at that time.22
The findings showed differences for youth growing up in rural and those in urban
areas. In rural areas such as Murewah and Thsolotsho, where the youth have
relatively less access to information about national politics and political events,
social institutions like the family, churches and schools seemed to have a much
bigger influence on their attitude to politics and forms of engagement than was
observed among urban and peri-urban youth. For instance, the above-mentioned
girl from Murewah explained how in her church the sermons and the Bible were
used to instruct the congregation to vote for ZANU-PF. Church leaders taught the
community that ‘good Christians should accept those that are in power and should
not undermine the One that is on the throne’, thus drawing parallels between God
and the President. One of the boys from Murewah explains how his teachers had
been influential in his support for ZANU-PF, saying: ‘… as you might be aware, if a
child is taught a language or anything when they are still young it is very difficult for
them to let go of that thing or language. It was inculcated in me that ZANU-PF is
the way to go and it now runs in my bloodstream’. 
The election violence of 2008 has had a great impact on those young people who
were old enough at the time to realise the seriousness of it, or to have directly
experienced acts of violence. Witnessing or experiencing acts of political violence
has a strong impact, but it can work either way: some of the youth decided to
become ‘real activists’ while the majority opted for complete withdrawal from
anything to do with politics. Importantly, however, in most cases the choice to
become very engaged or entirely disengaged seemed to have been informed to a
great extent by the young person’s social background and how they had been
raised in this political context.23 A boy from Murewah had lost his father who had
24 Interview, boy from Murewah, 3 December 2013.
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become a victim of the election violence in 2008. His father had been an active
supporter of MDC and therefore was taken to a ZANU-PF base camp, where he
was assaulted and subsequently died. ZANU-PF people then raided their home
and took all their livestock. The boy said: ‘I am sure, if he had not been involved in
opposition politics he would have been alive up to now. … Politics is bad because
it killed my father. If I am reminded of the events that killed my father I cry. The
situation is made worse because at school I meet the children whose parents
assaulted my father and I am always reminded of that time and I end up crying.’24
He did not attend any rally or event in 2013, because of what happened. Box 3.1
tells the story of Cathleen from Murewah and shows what motivated her
involvement in MDC.
Box 3.1 Cathleen from Murewah
Cathleen is 33 years old. Cathleen and her husband and were involved in the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (where Morgan Tsvangirai was General
Secretary) in the late 1990s. They joined MDC when it was formed in 1999. They
hoped for change when a young leader like Tsvangirai would be in power. They
particularly hoped for a better economy and livelihoods. Cathleen says her sister, who
was very active in politics, had a big influence on her, while their parents did not at all.
Because of her involvement in MDC, soldiers had once tried to assault her sister. Her
sister had successfully resisted that attack, but she had been harassed by soldiers
ever since. This motivated Cathleen to get involved with MDC too. She and her
husband were both imprisoned in 1999. They were severely beaten during the 2008
election violence and all their livestock and other assets were taken from them. They
still suffer the consequences, as her husband never fully recovered from his injuries
and they have never managed to fully re-establish their livelihoods. Cathleen
emphasises that there has to be change, no matter what. When her husband
proposed hiding during the 2013 elections she refused, saying, ‘We will all die one
day anyway.’ However, about the future elections in 2018 she says she will only
support the MDC-T ‘from the sideline’, because she is afraid there won’t be anyone to
take care of her children if she dies in election violence. Cathleen’s story shows her
engagement in MDC has a longer history of exposure and experience with
engagement, in which her husband played an important role. It also shows the
influence of a close family member and the events of 2008.
As well as the effect of having experienced or witnessed the election violence in
2008, knowledge of political violence in earlier years, and of how it had affected
family members, also influenced the young people’s attitude to politics. Some of our
participants referred to relatives who had been injured during the 2002 and 2005
elections, or whose families were badly affected by Operation Murambatsvina in
2005, as reasons for staying out of politics. In Matabeleland, the stories parents and
grandparents told about Gukurahundi had instilled a lot of fear. Again, for a minority
among our participants such events were a reason for engagement, but the
conditions under which they chose that path need further research.
The consequences of excessive political violence go beyond the immediate death
or injury of family members and loss of livestock. The boy from Murewah whose
father was killed in 2008 dropped out of school afterwards because his mother had
no money for school fees. Many of the young people associate the 2008 elections
with teacher strikes, schools closing, and exams being cancelled. Several of our
25 Interview, boy from Rangemore, 4 February 2014.
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participants had been unable to sit their exams and therefore missed out on their
diplomas. Thus, indirectly the election violence had affected their opportunities in the
job market. To many participants these were further reasons why party politics had
negative connotations and prompted disengagement from political life. Only one
boy from Rangemore indicated that he was motivated to become an MDC activist
and had mobilised others, because the ruling party had ‘destroyed’ his education.25
Finally, the findings show differences between age groups within the category
‘youth’. Younger people (aged 16–18) are relatively less exposed to political
violence, especially if they are attending school. They were very young when the
2008 elections took place and some had not been exposed to the election violence
at all. Many were aware, however, how it had affected their families and they knew
elections were periods of increased risk. Those aged 18–22 have already developed
political awareness. They are more likely to be targeted by political parties, party
youth and war veterans, because they have left school and need something to do,
and because they are new voters. They may well have experienced the 2008
election violence, which will have shaped their attitude to politics now. Many
emphasised that they had missed school and exams during this period, which
affected them badly. In the case of those older than 22–25, many have started
families of their own and have either ‘chosen sides’ or decided to stay as far away
from politics as possible. Many of them had experienced political violence in 2008
and also had memories of election violence in 2002 and 2005. Because of the
need to establish homes and families, this age group was particularly concerned
about forms of structural violence that were perpetuated by the political situation.
Thus, these findings do not negate the idea that a high level of unemployment
among youth is an important driver for engagement in political party activities, but
they offer a more nuanced perspective on what shapes the attitudes of towards the
political context. The next section discusses the diverse strategies young people
have developed in response to their political context and instances of political
violence.
4 Responses to political violence
and intimidation
The previous section showed that there is reason enough to think that young
people would be willing to engage in violence because of the structural causes of
the many forms of exclusion they face and the impact this has on their prospects
and opportunities. This last empirical section addresses the last of the central
questions of this study: how do young Zimbabwean citizens respond to political
violence? This section demonstrates the range of tactics observed, highlighting
gender differences where relevant. 
All of our participants consider political violence to be very serious and damaging,
and living with the feeling that one is always under surveillance has become a way
26 Focus group, girls, Goromonzi, 28 November 2013.
27 The label ‘sell-out’ is used by ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans for MDC-T supporters and those
who have ‘sold out’ the country to the West.
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of life. Youth use a combination of strategies in response to political violence and
intimidation, but clear differences exist between boys and girls. The findings show
that withdrawal from the public sphere and staying away from political actors and
discourses are the most important tactics in everyday life. These may be typical
responses to repressive regime environments, complementing Barter’s (2012)
framework on civilian strategies in contexts of armed conflict. Youth who decide to
be more actively engaged need other tactics and peer support to stay safe,
especially when they are involved with the opposition. 
4.1 Avoiding the public sphere
We had a number of ‘activists’ in our focus groups who openly supported a political
party. The majority of our participants, however, try to just ‘stay out’: don’t talk
politics, don’t do politics. Tactics include avoiding politics as a topic of
conversation, and avoiding the people and places associated with party politics.
When ‘outside’ in public places youth automatically avoid talking about politics: 
You only talk to people you know and not just anyone otherwise you will talk to
the CIO personnel without realising that that is what you are doing. I don’t find
the shops very safe – you will not know who is listening in to your
conversation. There may be plain clothes policemen around.26
A range of words is used to describe the people who might report you to the
government when they hear you talk against the regime: enemies, strangers,
outsiders, ‘sell-outs’27 (referring to people you know; informants among friends and
relatives), CIO, police, and plain clothes police. Avoiding sensitive issues in public
is almost a subconscious process: young people just speak about other things.
Some did say they felt sufficiently comfortable around very good friends – the ones
they grew up with – to speak about politics to a certain extent. Others mentioned
that one had to be careful even among friends, because there might be ‘sell-outs’
among them. 
In terms of behaviours, youth avoid being associated with ‘political activists’, war
veterans and NYS graduates, and party youth. Young people who opt for
withdrawal pay attention to their dress and avoid colours that are associated with
ZANU-PF (yellow and green) and MDC-T (red). It is particularly important to avoid
being labelled ‘opposition supporter’. Indeed, some of the MDC activists in our
study stated that many young people avoided any contact with them to prevent
being associated with MDC. Staying away from places where party activities were
likely to take place, like beer halls or community halls, was a tactic particularly
used during elections. Many participants stated it helped to find ‘something to do’
to stay off the streets during these times and avoid being targeted by the parties.
For girls, this mainly entails staying at home. For boys, playing soccer was an
important activity that enables them to stay out of politics and also to cope with the
negative consequences of violence.
28 Focus group, boys, Goromonzi, 25 August 2014.
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Participants reported it was not easy for young people, especially boys, to have a
social gathering, because the police would suspect it was a ‘political gathering’
where politics were discussed. If they want to organise any gathering they have to
seek permission from the police and, in rural areas, also from the headmen. Some
of the politically engaged youth have found ways to find a way round these rules.
In some areas there are ‘safe houses’ where they can meet. But also the less-
engaged youth just want to meet up as friends. Boys from Goromonzi said they
would therefore meet ‘in the bush’ if they wanted to talk, and after church
services.28 Also Kuwadzana youth said they sometimes met secretly in bushy
areas, hidden away from the public eye. 
Youth centres and community centres are not necessarily safe spaces. Some of
the community centres have been used as base camps and torture centres in past
elections. In everyday life the safety of these centres depends on whether certain
party-affiliated actors are dominating the space, and how. Community centres in
Bulawayo have long been supported by the City Council and, because of the
strength of MDC in the area since 2000, they can operate relatively autonomously.
Youth from Magwegwe said that young people supporting different parties could
take part in activities in the same centre. In Mashonaland, such public centres are
more likely to be politicised. 
Avoidance was the predominant strategy mentioned in all research sites, despite
the variation in possible exposure to political violence and intimidation. In all areas
the young people avoid party youth, while those in rural areas in particular need to
tread carefully because of living with war veterans and traditional leaders. The
relevance of avoidance tactics seems to be higher in Mashonaland, where there are
more tensions between government and opposition supporters, and more intense
regime control. Yet in Matabeleland, particularly in Tsholotsho, the legacy of
Gukurahundi intersects with the feeling of being always under surveillance. Even
though only a few of our participants from urban Magwegwe and peri-urban
Rangemore had directly experienced acts of violence – in contrast with the
experience of participants from Mashonaland – their suspicion of the public sphere
was persistent. In the first phase of the research all participants avoided mentioning
even the word ‘Gukurahundi’, but instead spoke of ‘what happened in the 1980s’.
Only in subsequent phases, when participants had become more familiar with the
research team, did some of them speak more openly about Gukurahundi if they
knew about it. They explained that other young people might not know about this
episode because parents and grandparents believed that not telling them was a
form of protection. Boys from Tsholotsho explained the presence of soldiers and
other uniformed security personnel invariably gave rise to suspicion. Even when
soldiers were deployed to assist the area after heavy floods in March 2014 it was
suspected that this could be a tactic to carry out political surveillance. 
4.2 Everyday co-existence
In everyday life, youth who support different parties have to live together in their
neighbourhoods. In between elections this need not create any friction. One only
29 Focus group, boys, Rangemore, 5 June 2013.
30 Focus group, girls. Tsholotsho, 3 June 2013. 
31 Individual interview, girl from Murewah, 3 December 2013.
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has to be careful around the more active supporters with links to the party, but
otherwise youth just ‘live together’. Both boys and girls reported they used such a
‘co-existence strategy’ and this strategy figured in all six research sites. A young
boy from Rangemore explained: 
We just tolerate ZANU-PF supporters. We act like they are not different from
anyone else. We let them be, because you don’t know what might happen if
you raise certain issues around them. At times you have to join them just to
keep the peace. You attend their functions. But come Election Day you just
vote for whoever you want to vote for.29
Many young people have to live with community members who participated in
political violence during past elections. They try to live together with these
perpetrators and behave as normally as possible towards them, in order to avoid
being ‘singled out’. A girl from Matabeleland explained how this works:
The fact that we know them or that we grew up with them, went to school with
them or are our neighbour makes we cannot change the way we relate with
them. Before elections these perpetrators are our friends and we relate quite
well with them until election time comes. Even during elections or times of
violence we still relate with them well so as to keep good relations lest you are
the next victim. Change in behaviour might attract violence so we do not try to
avoid them. Boys relate differently, they can make it clear when they do not
approve of something. They can be stubborn and can show intolerance and at
times they can provoke perpetrators. Girls can only do this only if they are
trained [to fight].30
In Murewah, where violence was severe in 2008, young people used the same
strategy. A minimum level of social interaction is maintained in the exchange of
‘pleasantries’: ‘We just greet each other. But sometimes people fight over past
hurts because people have not yet healed from the pain of what happened.’31 The
Shona expression used was ‘zino irema’, meaning you just smile even if you don’t
like them. Participants from Murewah mentioned that some of the perpetrators had
moved to other locations, some were affected by ‘spirits’ and became unwell, and
some had even come to show remorse to their victims.
4.3 Coping with election violence 
For all our participants, ‘everyday life’ ended when a new round of elections and
campaigns opened. Many had directly experienced election violence in 2008 and
some of our older participants also remembered events from 2002. All participants
agreed that the 2013 elections had been far less violent, but violent incidents did
occur in some places, young people were mobilised to attend rallies, and the
majority had experienced intimidation. In Mashonaland, the youth from Murewah
and Goromonzi reported that those involved in intimidation simply reminded people
32 Individual interview, girl from Kuwadzana, 29 November 2013.
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of the violence in the past to ‘keep them in line’. They referred to ‘giving people
short sleeves’, which implied the cutting off of hands and arms by way of warning.32 
During the election period the usual tactics such as withdrawal from the public
sphere and avoidance are sometimes insufficient. Other tactics are required,
including leaving the home area, hiding, varying degrees of compliance with forced
participation in party activities, and sometimes participation in violence. In the
focus group discussions in Phase 1, none of the participants came out to us that
s/he had participated in violence and they mainly talked about coerced
participation. In Phase 2, some participants told their stories in individual
interviews, which showed the complexity of their navigation: some had voluntarily
opted to fight in MDC groups or ZANU-PF militia, for some their participation in
youth militia was totally under coercion, and some had managed to avoid ‘doing
the worst’ even when coerced into perpetrating violent acts. 
Temporary migration to towns or other regions in Zimbabwe thought to be less
violent was one form of ‘exit’ (Barter 2012); it was a strategy mentioned by a few of
the participants. For instance, three girls from Murewah said their mother had sent
them to stay with relatives in Harare during the 2013 elections. Especially in
Matabeleland, migrating to South Africa was mentioned as a tactic adopted by
some young people. However, only three of our participants stated that they
themselves had left for South Africa because of election violence and it was not
possible to estimate the total number who had done this. Youth from Tsolotsho
reported that some of the youth who had participated in the violence in 2008 left for
South Africa afterwards, feeling uncomfortable about what they had done.
Participants also reported, however, that some of them had returned prior to the
2013 elections, looking for opportunities to gain from from them.
When speaking about themselves, participants felt that forced recruitment was a
major barrier to staying out of election politics and violence. They stated that boys
were more often targeted than girls, who can hide in the house. On the other hand,
girls felt they more quickly became victims of sexual abuse when they were
targeted. The young people said there was little one could do in the case of
coerced participation. A degree of compliance was deemed necessary. Sometimes,
joining youth militias was a strategy to avoid becoming a victim. Stories about
events in past elections or direct experiences with violence compounded the fear
of being harmed. The following quotes are from Goromonzi, where 2008 election
violence left a strong imprint.
Just recently in March 2013 I was forced to do ZANU-PF slogans and sing war
songs at the beer hall. It was embarrassing and scary at the same time but I had
no choice. I was threatened with assault and I have seen them doing that to
others so was really scared for my life. Intimidation also happens during grain
distribution exercises in the community. People suspected for being opposition
supporters are blatantly told that they would not benefit from the grain and war
veterans and youth militias will be very active at the distribution. So, one has to
be careful not to be seen to be supporting the MDC if you want to benefit from
government programmes. We also have to pretend to like what ZANU-PF is
33 Focus group, boys, Goromonzi, 17 July 2014.
34 Individual interview, boy from Goromonzi, 2 December 2013.
35 Individual interview, girl from Goromonzi, 2 December 2013.
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doing because we also want to benefit from the council land and properties that
locals can benefit. If you are known to be MDC you don’t benefit at all.33
I can see that if I don’t do what they want they will take away my farm. I cannot
leave the farm, because my father is now old and I have to be in charge so I
have to toe the ZANU-PF line to keep it. I engaged in [election] politics in
2001. I was part of the youth that raided farms and committed acts of violence.
We would beat up MDC supporters. Recently towards elections [2013] we
were forced to tell people that they should vote ‘correctly’.34
However, even when coerced into participation, some young people would try to
limit the extent or length of their involvement. This girl from Goromonzi explained: 
There used to be a youth base by the shops in Goromonzi in 2008. One day
when my friend and I went to the shops, they [ZANU-PF party youth] called us
to the base. […] They said they would use us to go to homesteads where
people were deemed to be opposition members and we would take their
livestock and food so as to feed the people at the bases and also to beat
defectors so that they would come back to the ruling party. I think we went to
about three villages and at the fourth one my friend and I ran away under the
pretext that we were going to the shops.35
When speaking about other youth, or ‘ordinary youth’, participants acknowledged
there are certainly large numbers of young people who engage in party activities
for material benefit, or hopes thereof, including involvement in party-orchestrated
violence. They have a nickname for such opportunistic youth: ‘the two-Rands’,
referring to the two South African Rand they are paid for joining in. Participants
related the high levels of unemployment among youth and not having anything to
do directly to how easily politicians could ‘appropriate’ young people. With just a
little money, t-shirts and party regalia young people can be persuaded to join
rallies, to mobilise others to join in, and to engage in violence. In urban areas like
Kuwadzana, politicians would make use of the high prevalence of addiction, giving
young people alcohol and drugs in exchange for their involvement. Our participants
viewed the NYS graduates as different from the opportunistic ‘ordinary youth’ who
get involved during elections. They referred to NYS youth as ‘youth militias’ more
consistently, they regarded them as more embedded in ZANU-PF structures than
ordinary young people, and as being, in between election periods, part of the state
machinery that excluded opposition supporters when it came to distribution of
fertilisers and food aid.
As mentioned in Section 2.3 on research methodology, few of our participants
admitted to having taken part in violence during elections and obviously, those who
did, would not readily admit they had done so for opportunistic reasons. The majority
spoke about their participation as being coerced, while MDC activists emphasised
the need for self-defence. At the same time, this study provides sufficient evidence to
argue that material interest is not the only explanation for youth’s involvement in
36 The conditions under which these emerged, and the forms of social leadership that enable the functioning
of these groups, will be discussed in detail in a future IDS Practice Paper by Pettit (forthcoming 2015).
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election violence. Furthermore, the study shows there is a large group of young
people who try to resist becoming involved in election violence.
4.4 Instances of citizen agency
4.4.1 Doing some good in alternative spaces
Many of the participants saw ‘the lack of something to do’ as a reason for young
people being enticed by party politics. Starting activities in the informal economy was
therefore not only a livelihood strategy, but for many also a way of staying out of
politics. Although parts of the informal economy in some areas may also be
politicised, there is room to develop economic activities independently of the systems
of patronage. For the boys, engagement in sports activities was another way to
keep off the streets. Politicians would attempt to have control over the organisation
of soccer games and ‘claim’ them for their party, but most of the boys considered
soccer games as neutral spaces where people should not bring in party politics. 
In two out of the six research sites young people had started initiatives that developed
into forms of citizen engagement in community life. In Goromonzi, the local residents’
association had set up a youth chapter to encourage young people to start
development projects and small-business initiatives, like planting potatoes or brick-
moulding. Encouraged by adult members of the association, some of the youth were
forming groups. Several of our Goromonzi participants were members of this youth
club. They felt their participation could hopefully lead to alternative livelihoods, and at
the same time it might keep them away from politicians with the wrong intentions.
In Magwegwe, a group of young people had started an informal school and
organised classes in a room rented out by a local church. They helped students
and school drop-outs to prepare for their ‘O’ levels. Also in Magwegwe, young
people had started arts clubs and dance groups. They came together for
rehearsals in the local community centre and tried to generate income through
performing at festivals and private parties. As with the youth club in Goromonzi,
participants emphasised that these groups helped them to improve not only their
own lives, but also that of their communities, in a context of high unemployment
and political polarisation. These arts groups had to navigate the political
environment just as individuals did. In the run-up to elections the members had
been approached to perform for election candidates. They had refused as they
wanted to stay neutral, even if that meant less access to resources and future
opportunities. They also had to deal with patronage practices when interacting with
the arts councils and registration procedures. What characterises these groups is
the strong social network among their members, who do not just do arts activities
together but look after one another as a ‘surrogate family’. This helps them stay
strong, even when they face political threats. Participants in these groups claimed
that the groups and their activities were apolitical, but they did feel that they
represented an alternative to the ways in which party politics enforces itself upon
the youth. Seen in that light, the groups are small acts of resistance. All in all, these
initiatives offered hope and alternative spaces for engagement.36
37 In all sites we asked whether social media offered ‘safe spaces’ for political expression. Urban youth
are better connected to the internet and mobile phone networks. However, most of them commented
that one might read political debates, but would not ‘like’ them on Facebook or comment on them in a
way that might expose one’s identity to state surveillance systems. Internet and closed user groups
may offer possibilities, but young people do not consider them to be an entirely safe space.
38 None of our participants from Matabeleland labelled themselves as activist, but we do not want to
suggest any relationship between this region and levels of activism on the basis of our data set.
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4.4.2 Resistance and defiance 
The participants unanimously agreed that it was very hard to openly resist the
systems of state repression and forms of structural violence. The majority of our
participants could not think of examples in which youth had ‘come out’ against
systemic violence, apart from when violent clashes erupted between party youth from
different parties. Yet, several examples of acts of resistance and defiance did emerge. 
In Kuwadzana, MDC-T youth had openly confronted ZANU-PF youth when ZANU-PF
wanted to claim a library for the party during the 2013 election campaigns. The
public library had been built with donor funds when Learnmore Jongwe (MDC) was
MP. MP Nelson Chemisa (MDC-T) had allocated resources to furnish and equip
the library. The aspiring ZANU-PF candidate tried to claim the library for his
campaign, by using the opening ceremony as a ZANU-PF function. MDC-T youth,
including several of our participants, mobilised through WhatsApp.37 They also
called in back-up from MDC-T youth at the provincial level. They protested at the
ceremony in large numbers, removing ZANU-PF posters from walls. The function
had to be abandoned, before the situation escalated into violence. 
A boy from rural Murewah told us he was part of a group of community members
who are excluded from the distribution of fertiliser by their headman. One day, they
decided to hold their own gathering when the headman had called a meeting. Our
participant labelled this an act of defiance. The group then decided to go out into
the forest area that is designated for the headman, and they collected wild fruits as
an act of protest, because it is forbidden to do so. Unfortunately this led to a
backlash, because the headman called the police and people were harassed.
In one of our research sites there is a female activist who is part of an activist women’s
organisation. She is often harassed by security agents and was a victim of political
violence in the 2008 elections. The young people reported that community members
try to protect her. When residents see that security agents are hanging around her
house they secretly tip her off, so she can escape over the fence. These instances,
even when small, can be significant to those who take part in them. ‘Weapons of the
weak’ (Scott 1985) can build a sense of solidarity among the marginalised who face
repression and strengthen them as they realise that their grievances are legitimate. 
4.5 The party activists
A few of our participants from Mashonaland labelled themselves as ‘activists’.38 We
had a number of ZANU-PF and MDC-T activists from rural Murewah, and MDC-T
activists from urban Kuwadzana – both boys and girls. They called themselves
‘activists’ for their connections with the party and adult party members and for their
voluntary involvement in campaign activities. Asked about their motivations, none
39 Focus group, girls, Murewah, 26 August 2014.
40 These discussions happened only three months after the elections and in the subsequent twelve
months MDC-T faced serious challenges to its credibility as an opposition force. 
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of them said they were driven primarily by material gain. The ZANU-PF youth from
Murewah felt strongly about Mugabe as the ‘father’ of the nation and ZANU-PF as
the right party, whereas MDC-T supporters were considered sell-outs of the
country. Interestingly, in one of the focus groups with the Murewah girls, their
reasons for supporting ZANU-PF emerged when discussing the term ‘born-free’,
which for them had positive connotations: 
[P2] Being born free means we are now able to speak our minds and we
should be heard. We should be able to effect change on some of the policies.
Our elders tell us that they were downtrodden before independence and could
not rise to protest against oppressive policies but now, things have changed.
People are now flexible to form and follow their own political parties.
[P1] Things are much better now [since independence]. The level of education
has improved. Most of our parents are illiterate but almost everyone in the
younger generation is literate. I can even greet a white man! This shows that
things have changed for the better.
[P3] Before independence, life was hard. Blacks were disregarded and enslaved
by the white men. We are now called born-frees because we were born when
the trouble was over, through the sacrifice of the heroes. They sacrificed their
lives to get us where we are today. […] Now, we have the free will and we can
make our own decisions. The sky is the limit nowadays. However, we are not
very free because we are downtrodden so we are half free.
[P4] I love to be called born-free because I am free to do what I want without
any reservations. I am now able to wear decent clothes and not the ancient
clothes which were worn in the ancient days. The days where the
Musengabere practice was rampant have been since subdued by modern
marriages. Nowadays everyone is free to marry or elope with whom she loves.39
To a certain extent this discussion reflects the perceptions urban youth have about
rural youth: that in rural areas, the youth are not exposed to information and will
easily believe the ZANU-PF rhetoric they hear from war veterans, party leaders
and headmen. 
Many of the MDC-T youth declared that they ‘just want change’ and – seeing
ZANU-PF as the main cause of state repression and economic decline – they felt
that change was possible only through MDC-T. Especially among the MDC-T
youth, strong social ties were important for mutual support to deal with security
threats and with life challenges more generally. MDC-T youth from Kuwadzana and
Goromonzi had directly experienced violence during the 2008 elections. In
Goromonzi, the youth reported that they moved only in groups in their area and at
night they would sleep in one house so they could defend themselves. Youth from
Kuwadzana had kept a ‘low profile’ in 2013 to avoid new violence, and had agreed
among themselves not to join in any violent activity. All of them were extremely
disappointed with the 2013 election results and were unsure about what to do next.40
55
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 79
A number of those who had been active for a political party emphasised it had
offered them opportunities to develop themselves, usually in terms of leadership.
For instance, for the drawing exercise that reflected ‘a moment of empowerment’
several participants had drawn a self-portrait. They showed themselves standing
on a small stage and speaking at a political meeting, or mobilising others for
campaigns. These activities had given them a sense of recognition and respect
within an organised structure. Some of them had drawn themselves when they
were heads of their class at school. Other than that, the opportunities for gaining
skills and confidence in organised youth collectives are scarce. In this light,
involvement in political parties to some extent counters a sense of social and
political exclusion among certain young people.
Box 4.1 The story of a community activist
Adam’s story is another example of how agency develops over time through social
interaction and events. Adam joined a labour union when he was young, which helped
him become aware of economic and political oppression, as people were fired from
work without receiving any benefits. He joined the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions and learnt about the problems of unemployment and labour rights. He joined
the food riots of the 1990s and participated in stay-aways and strikes, which made
him lose his job. His role model then was Tendai Biti, who he described as young and
vibrant and whom he admired for his political ideology. He learnt a lot from his friends,
with whom he exchanged ideas and advice. He joined MDC and had a position within
the party structures. 
The 2008 elections formed a critical juncture when he was targeted for his
involvement in MDC by ZANU-PF militia. He was abducted and taken to a secret
location where he was assaulted and was shown bodies of dead people. He was
forced to admit his engagement in MDC and reveal the names of everyone involved in
opposition politics in his area. When he complied with these demands, he was
released and went home. He had given in to his captors in order to protect his family,
which was in danger. His father gave him some money and he left his area for some
time. His relatives, especially his parents, were isolated by other members of the
society at social gatherings because of his involvement. The situation started to calm
down after elections, and Adam returned home. His ward councillor was MDC. The
youth in Adam’s area started getting involved in income-generating projects like
carpentry and welding, and he took part in these. He received training and was
provided with a welding machine plus a loan from the bank. 
Adam attended some workshops at Silveira House, where he learnt about how to deal
with violence. He said he and other participants were ridiculed by his friends and
comrades who thought they were cowards. Sometimes he and his friends thought of
retaliation, but they were afraid of the consequences. It would not have stopped the
violence but only increased it. In the lead-up to the 2013 elections he became active
for a CBO that carried out activities aimed at community healing. He said he was
probably the most active person in his ward, organising youth from across the political
divide in meetings to discuss and encourage peaceful elections. He engaged the
chiefs, the political leadership and the church leaders as well. His family was
suspicious at first, thinking he had defected to ZANU-PF, but later they started to
support him.
Adam’s trajectory shows the importance of role models, friends and family, of
experience gained through collective action and events. He eventually left party
politics, but now he takes his experience elsewhere whenever he is offered a space
for building citizen agency.
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5 Conclusions 
This research report has described how youth from six different places in
Zimbabwe experience their citizenship. It has discussed the various forms of
violence they experience in everyday life and during the turbulence of elections, it
has shown how they respond to forms of violence, and has indicated the important
factors that inform their agency. This final section summarises the findings about
how violence and politics are entangled, and how young Zimbabwean citizens
exercise agency in response to violence in their everyday lives. The section
finishes with recommendations for civil society organisations and policymakers
aiming to work with young people to improve their lives and the prospects for
democracy in Zimbabwe.
In terms of a sense of citizenship, the findings show that Zimbabwean youth share
the experience of being second-class citizens with their peers in many other African
countries (Honwana 2011). They feel let down by the political systems that have
failed to create employment and are failing to maintain good-quality levels of
education. The findings also show differences within Zimbabwe. The youth in
Mashonaland and Matabeleland share a sense of marginalisation, but the Shona
youth see themselves as Zimbabweans, while the Ndebele youth feel they do not
even belong to Zimbabwe. This lack of a sense of citizenship has historical reasons
and young people strongly believe that the regime has cut off Matabeleland because
of its support to the opposition. Yet within Mashonaland, rural youth feels
marginalised compared with urban youth. Thus, while several of our young
participants supported ZANU-PF there is a sense of disappointment about what the
regime has failed to do for youth. Also, the horizontal relations between youth and
society, among youth and within families are important for their citizenship. Young
people feel excluded by older generations, including older family members, they feel
their opinions are not valued and that they are denied a voice. To a certain extent,
political party structures offer a sense of community and belonging, in a society that
offers few opportunities to young citizens to develop themselves. This explains the
relationship between the youth identity, one marked by social and political exclusion,
and the readiness among some youth to be part of a violent political system. 
This study showed how political violence is viewed and experienced by youth.
Participants had a deep awareness of how violence and politics are entangled,
before, during and after elections. They emphasised that political violence peaked
during the period of elections, and it included highly visible forms of physical
violence, coercion and intimidation. A few months after elections the situation
settles, although political intimidation of (suspected) opposition supporters never
completely subsides and the permanent sense of being under surveillance is part
of ordinary life. The extent to which intimidation of the opposition is experienced as
a real threat in everyday life varies according to location and the local political
context. Thus, in Mashonaland, the youth feel more often intimidated by state
security actors like the police, even if they are not politically active for the
opposition. In Matabeleland intimidation is perceived as less of a problem once
elections are over. In Magwegwe and Rangemore the situation eases significantly.
However, young people associate the presence of state institutions staffed by
Shona people with the regimes’s determination to maintain a degree of control.
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This is compounded by what they know about Gukurahundi and experiences of the
2008 elections. Factors such as ethnicity and party affiliation come together in a
place like urban Magwegwe, where the youth are often harassed by the Shona
police force because they speak a different language, but also, in the background
is the fact that the Shona are associated with the regime. Young people always
remain cautious, especially in Thsolotsho. 
The report has described the numerous forms of violence that youth experience in
everyday life, as well as the election violence. Young women and girls are more
concerned with everyday violence like domestic violence, social exclusion based on
gendered norms, and crime and violence, than the political violence, which is
‘seasonal’. Many young people face problems that are caused by various types of of
structural violence. They are aware that certain forms of structural violence are
politicised, such as exclusion from jobs, loans and land ownership based on party
membership. Exclusion strategies vary across locations, depending on the sources
of livelihood in each place. Thus, rural youth associated with the opposition are
excluded from access to land and agricultural inputs, while urban youth are more
likely to face difficulties when trying to run a market stall or to get a loan to start up a
business. Other forms of structural violence are not caused by party politics, for
example,  social exclusion by older generations. All youth, regardless of party
affiliation, share the view that young people are inadequately represented in formal
political institutions. Even though ZANU-PF youth are relatively closer to state power,
they note that younger people are not in strategic positions. Youth from Murewah felt
they were excluded from economic opportunities despite their support for ZANU-PF
and thought that all economic opportunities were concentrated in urban areas. 
Young people generally perceive the public sphere to be unsafe because of the
deep division between ZANU-PF and the opposition parties (more so now that the
opposition is weakening), and the presence of state security actors and party-
affiliated actors like party youth, NYS graduates and war veterans. The public
sphere has narrowed, because certain topics that are central to it (such as
government performance, national politics) are avoided in public conversations. As
this study has shown, there is variation across youth sub-identities and across
locations. In rural Murewah, the youth supporting ZANU-PF do not experience the
public sphere as totally unsafe, because generally they do not make critical
comments about the government, whereas those who support MDC have to be
very cautious. Also in Goromonzi, where ZANU-PF has a strong interest and
where relations between party supporters are tense, MDC supporters need to be
careful. In urban Magwegwe and peri-urban Rangemore, Matabeleland, young
people are less worried because they have grown up in areas that have been
MDC-dominated since 2000. In rural Thsolotsho, however, the youth are very
cautious. Despite MDC being in control of local government, young people
adjusted their discourses in public, but also even in the private sphere of the home;
this apparently excessive caution can be attributed largely to the fact that the
young people have been raised by a generation of parents and grandparents who
experienced Gukurahundi. 
The findings of this study challenge the notion that the public and private spheres
are strictly separated. In all sites, young people experience the state of constant
surveillance as an encroachment on their private sphere. A phrase like ‘the walls
41 Because we had accessed the six sites through two NGOs involved in community healing, some of
the youth knew about these two organisations. Only the youth from Thsolotsho (Matabeleland) had
participated in activities run by other NGOs.
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have eyes and ears’ reflects how the state has invaded the private sphere of the
home. Whether this is true or a mere perception, the effect is that some young
people are reluctant to discuss politics at home. The private sphere has thus been
transformed into an ‘invaded’ or ‘state-captured’ sphere, limiting freedom of
expression at home. Altogether, the young people felt there was a real lack of public
space for them to get together and interact, whether in terms of physical spaces or
of opportunities. Many of our participants commented that the only time they felt
free to interact with one another was in the series of focus groups organised for this
study, or at workshops organised by local NGOs.41 They acknowledged that the
politicisation of the public sphere was a major problem, which made it difficult to get
to know each other and to overcome the volatility of political divisions. 
Different forms of violence require different responses. The findings suggest that
the agency adopted by youth varies because there is variation in the patterns and
intensity across rural, peri-urban and urban areas. Within locations, variation in
agency is most likely explained by gender and age; younger boys and girls are
less exposed than those aged 18 and above, who are more likely to be targeted by
political actors. The report has demonstrated a range of possible responses to
political violence. In everyday life, the most common strategy used by young
people is strategic avoidance of places and actors associated with political
violence, and avoidance of conversation topics that might attract the attention of
security agents. When political intimidation intensifies around the time of elections,
girls try to shut themselves away by hiding at home. For boys, who in everyday life
are much more present in public spaces and more mobile, it is easier to
temporarily leave their area. For everyone, forced participation in party activities is
hard to resist, especially when door-to-door campaigns are organised. However,
even when participation is coerced, many young people try to maintain some
control over the level or duration of their participation. 
The report has highlighted the factors that shape youth’s responses to politics and
violence. It emphasised that social background, especially family and friends, has a
strong impact on young people’s attitude to the political environment generally and to
violence in particular. Family members and friends ‘teach’ them tactics to avoid or
deal with violence. In addition, prior experience of violence during the 2008 elections
had left a strong impression on many young people. Some opted for complete
disengagement after an experience of violence, while others were motivated to
become more engaged in politics. Family and friends can also encourage youth
involvement in politics, especially when an older family member is already involved.
In addition, it must be noted that involvement in a political party – especially when in
some sort of leadership position – is appealing to some young people, because they
gain respect, recognition and experience from it. In a context where young people
experience social exclusion and where alternative forms of youth mobilisation are
scarce, political parties thus offer more than just material incentives.
Where there are positive instances of citizen agency, such as the alternative
school and arts clubs in Magwegwe, these share certain characteristics. First of all,
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the strong social relations among the participants were important for carving out
and protecting these safe spaces. Second, these activities combine livelihood
activities with social engagement. Third, they are activities that do not confront the
regime but seek to circumvent it, and thus subvert it. Finally, those involved seek
constructive relationships with parents to gain support in the community. 
Thus, this report demonstrates that one needs to look at the broader social context
in which youth is embedded to understand how they deal with polarisation, politics
and violence. Youth empowerment programmes tend to emphasise the creation of
employment and livelihoods as a strategy to mitigate youth involvement in violence.
In other words, they focus on economic inclusion and economic empowerment to
make young people into better citizens. This is important, but the findings of the
study point at a number of issues currently neglected by such an approach: (1) this
approach will not tackle social and political exclusion; (2) it overlooks the importance
of social relations among young people and between them and their families, which
encourage or discourage political engagement (including involvement in violence).
In other words, economic empowerment strategies are sufficient for nurturing youth
to become democratic citizens and need to be complemented with other strategies. 
A key recommendation of this report is to view active citizenship among Zimbabwean
youth as a priority area for interventions by government, civil society and aid actors
that needs a diversity of approaches and strategies. This requires a shift in thinking
about the position of youth in society and what makes young people active and
capable citizens. Youth are not just a reservoir of labour with economic potential.
They also have ideas and the potential to address violence and polarisation in
Zimbabwean politics and society. The question is what kind of exposure and
support do they need to unlock this potential. Young people have highlighted, in
this study, that their structural exclusion from equal citizenship undermines their
agency. Therefore interventions need to address all dimensions of exclusion: the
social, economical and the political. Social relationships among young people and
between them and their communities need to be strengthened for youth to feel
supported in playing a full role as citizens. Supporting the political participation of
youth requires local and national government to design and implement
interventions that take account of young people’s views. Clearly, more is required
than the often highly localised initiatives that bring youth together in sports clubs
and savings schemes. These do not respond either to the magnitude of the
problems faced by young people, or to young people’s ambitions and potential.
This leads to the following specific recommendations for youth programmes:
1. Youth want and need opportunities to meet and interact socially outside the
deeply politicised arena. If well organised and protected from political party
activities, this can establish a social foundation for learning and practising how
to discuss issues of public concern, bridge political divisions, and take
collective action. 
Young people would like to have the opportunity to interact, to gain social
leadership skills and develop life skills. They need to be seen as agents who
can take on issues of public concern, debate and organise. Well-trained
facilitators that are able to unite youth, facilitate public dialogue and encourage
and guide collective action are of crucial importance. Ultimately, these
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activities need to transform a political culture among youth from one that is
characterised by suspicion and antagonism to one of trust and collaboration.
There are examples of community centres and youth centres where youth
groups have initiated their own activities and maintained a neutral space. It is
possible to build on this experience and introduce new activities and attract a
broader group of young people. But one can also imagine a range of spaces
where young people could be exposed to debate and social interactions:
universities, youth centres, sports clubs, theatres, music studios, festivals,
internet cafes and IT hubs. A risk that needs to be addressed, however, is that
such spaces become politicised when party-affiliated actors try to appropriate
initiatives.
2. Devise strategies that build ‘citizen capabilities’ among youth such as civic
leadership, dialogue and collective action around issues of public concern, and
build young people’s experience in accessing and negotiating with public
authorities. 
Starting points for encouraging debate and collective action are issues that
matter to youth, such as security in public spaces, sexual and reproductive
health facilities, the quality of education, and vocational training opportunities.
Collective action as well as citizen agency can be stimulated: what can we do
as young people and how do we liaise with public authority to play its part?
Even livelihood activities can be organised in a way that they nurture
leadership and collaboration among young people, forms of representation,
and connections with, for example, local government actors, councillors, youth
ward officers and headmen. 
3. Build social relationships and between youth and communities to overcome
social exclusion.
To enhance the position of the country’s youth, families and communities need
to be involved in efforts that recognise the value, perspectives and capacities
of young people. This will require a variety of approaches. One example would
be to facilitate dialogue between young people and parents and community
leaders. Where youth initiatives have been developed, expanding these and
showcasing them to their community might help to shift the community’s
perspective to one that appreciates its youth. 
Social marginalisation of youth is strongly gendered. To enhance the position
of young women, change needs to happen in the domestic as well as the
public sphere, involving families as much as male youth. 
Interventions cannot be implemented without due attention being paid to the
adverse political context. In the current political climate there is not much room for
progressive changes in the political culture of governance and the mechanisms of
state repression. To nurture youth as democratic citizens, certain issues need to be
addressed that are highly sensitive and politicised: the structural marginalisation of
Matabeleland, a truth and reconciliation process for victims of Gukurahundi, the
deep-rooted systems of patronage, the entrenched interests of political elites –
down to the very local level of the headmen – and a culture of impunity. The
above-proposed recommendations will not directly, and definitely not immediately,
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tackle such big and systemic issues. Nor is it desirable to make young citizens
solely responsible for addressing such challenges. Rather, the proposed strategies
may contribute to nurturing a generation of citizens who are able to imagine a
different country and democracy, and are able to relate and engage peacefully with
their peers and others so as to take steps towards realising that aspiration. 
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